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ABSTRACT
This Article critically examines the legal nature of credit default
swaps. Functionally a form of credit default insurance, CDSs are
however commonly characterized as largely unregulated financial
derivatives, and were widely blamed for exacerbating the global
financial crisis of 2007-09 and contributing to the European debt
crisis starting in 2010.
This Article demonstrates that the
classification of CDSs as derivatives is due to a misapplication of
insurance law principles and a glaring misreading of relevant
legislation. Furthermore, CDSs are structurally and economically
not swaps, which raises suspicions of deliberate evasion of the law
by classifying them as swaps. Given the widespread confusion
surrounding CDSs, this Article examines the history of the legal
concept of swaps and demonstrates that the International Swaps and
Derivatives Association developed them in order to exploit
regulatory exemptions, which were later extended to an increasing
range of deregulated transactions. Additionally, the Dodd-Frank Act
reforms, which seek to control the excesses of financial innovation,
paradoxically consolidate the regime of largely unregulated swaps.
Ongoing legal and policy issues are highlighted.
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INTRODUCTION
Credit default swaps (“CDSs”) have been subject to heated debates.
The opacity of piled-up risks due to CDSs and securitization is seen as
one cause of the banking crisis of 2007-09, 1 and CDS speculation is
blamed for exacerbating the European sovereign debt crisis that started
in 2010.2 Apart from igniting regulatory debates, these crises revealed a
legal problem: how should these contracts be legally classified and
regulated?3

1. See, e.g., FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY
REPORT 8–10, 50–51, 140–46, 188–95, 200–02, 243–44, 348–51, 376–79 (2011),
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf [hereinafter
FCIC REPORT]. But see id. at 447 (dissenting statement).
2. See, e.g., James Rickards, How Markets Attacked the Greek Piñata, FIN. TIMES
(Feb. 11, 2010), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e7168fc6-1740-11df-94f6-00144feab49a
.html; Wolfgang Münchau, Time to Outlaw Naked Credit Default Swaps, FIN. TIMES
(Feb. 28, 2010), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/7b56f5b2-24a3-11df-8be0-00144feab49a
.html.
3. See, e.g., Arthur Kimball-Stanley, Insurance and Credit Default Swaps: Should
Like Things Be Treated Alike?, 15 CONN. INS. L. J. 241 (2008) (arguing that CDSs are
functionally similar to insurance); M. Todd Henderson, Credit Derivatives Are Not
“Insurance”, 16 CONN. INS. L. J. 1 (2009) [hereinafter Henderson, Credit Derivatives
Are Not “Insurance”] (disagreeing with Kimball-Stanley); Oskari Juurikkala, Credit
Default Swaps and Insurance: Against the Potts Opinion, 26 J. INT’L BANKING L. &
REG. 128 (2011) [hereinafter Juurikkala, Potts Opinion] (arguing that at least some
CDSs may be insurance contracts).
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In terms of legal categories, there are two fundamental views of
CDSs. One is the derivatives-based understanding that CDSs are
essentially options or swaps. 4 This view tends to be skeptical of
regulation, highlighting the benefits of CDSs and the disadvantages of
insurance law and favoring self-governance or, at most, central
counterparty clearing of CDSs.5 The opposing view is the insurancebased understanding of CDSs, which often coincides with arguments in
favor of regulation.6
The current legal and regulatory environment is a puzzling mixture
of both of these views. On the one hand, CDSs are commonly assumed
to be largely unregulated derivatives, but the legal argument for this
view is doubtful if not entirely mistaken.7 On the other hand, post-crisis
reforms, such as the Dodd-Frank Act, 8 mostly reflect the derivativesbased view, but at the same time, U.S. state legislators sought to regulate
CDSs as insurance 9 while similar proposals were mooted at federal
level. 10 Moreover, the new European sovereign CDS short-selling
prohibition, adopted in 2012, “reflects an insurance-based understanding
of credit default swaps.”11
4. For representative views, see Robert F. Schwartz, Risk Distribution in the
Capital Markets: Credit Default Swaps, Insurance and a Theory of Demarcation, 12
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 167 (2007); Houman B. Shadab, Guilty by Association?
Regulating Credit Default Swaps, 4 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L. J. 407, 419–21 (2010);
Henderson, Credit Derivatives Are Not “Insurance”, supra note 3.
5. See Henderson, Credit Derivatives Are Not “Insurance,” supra note 3, at 22–
46, 56–59; Shadab, supra note 4, at 435–41, 452–62.
6. See Benjamin B. Saunders, Should Credit Default Swap Issuers Be Subject to
Prudential Regulation?, 10 J. OF CORP. L. STUD. 427 (2010) (advocating reserves
regulation for CDSs sellers); Kimball-Stanley, supra note 3, at 248–49 (2008);
Juurikkala, Potts Opinion, supra note 3 (finding flaws in the legal arguments for the
derivatives-based understanding). This view has also been adopted by U.S. insurance
regulators recently. See infra Part II.H.3–4. On reserves regulation, see, for example,
PETER D. SPENCER, THE STRUCTURE AND REGULATION OF FINANCIAL MARKETS 68–69
(2000) (explaining the prudential regulation of insurance companies). On the insurable
interest doctrine, see infra Part II.E.1.
7. See infra Part II.
8. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010); see infra Part III.C.
9. See infra Part II.H.4.
10. See infra note 347 and accompanying text.
11. Oskari Juurikkala, Credit Default Swaps and the EU Short Selling Regulation:
A Critical Analysis, 9 EUR. COMPANY & FIN. L. REV. 307, 309 (2012) [hereinafter
Juurikkala, EU Short Selling Regulation]; see also Regulation on Short Selling and
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Earlier studies have incompletely addressed the matter, but this
Article provides the first in-depth analysis of the issues concerning the
legal characterization of CDSs.12 The Article is structured as follows.
Part I presents an overview of CDSs, explaining their mechanics and
uses, summarizing their benefits and risks, and discussing how the
current legal environment has given rise to both uncertainty and major
misunderstandings.
Part II investigates the relationship between insurance law and
CDSs. It summarizes the consequences of insurance regulation,
discusses the different ways of demarcating insurance law, and
scrutinizes the arguments that CDSs are not insurance. In addition to
correcting misinterpretations of insurance law, Part II also sheds light on
the economic functioning of CDSs. Finally, this Part analyzes the
evolution of the views of U.S. state insurance regulators on this matter.
Part III explores how CDSs came to be considered deregulated
swap transactions. It traces the history and evolution of derivatives law
and pays special attention to the legal and political influences of the
International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA), an industry
organization of the derivatives business.13 This Part demonstrates how
ISDA skillfully obtained exemptions to the regulations and manipulated
key concepts, such as swaps, in order to widen the space of unregulated
activities. Finally, Part III critically examines the Dodd-Frank Act
reforms, showing that they paradoxically consolidate ISDA’s regime of
deregulated derivatives.

Certain Aspects of Credit Default Swaps (EU) 236/2012, 2012 O.J. (L86/1) (Mar. 14,
2012).
12. The majority of legal papers on CDSs focus on the question of whether CDSs
should be regulated as insurance or otherwise, addressing the classification problem in
current law only cursorily. See, e.g., Kimball-Stanley, supra note 3; Saunders, supra
note 6 (both favoring insurance regulation); Henderson, Credit Derivatives Are Not
“Insurance,” supra note 3; Schwartz, supra note 4 (both opposing insurance
regulation). The specific legal question is addressed in Juurikkala, Potts Opinion, supra
note 3, but only with respect to the Potts opinion. Earlier studies have also included
significant errors, for example, regarding the interpretation of New York Insurance
Law. See infra notes 64–68 and accompanying text.
13. See Joanne P. Braithwaite, Standard Form Contracts as Transnational Law:
Evidence From the Derivatives Markets, 75 MODERN L. REV. 779 (2012) (describing
ISDA’s contract architecture).
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I. CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS: AN OVERVIEW
A. DESCRIPTION
The history of CDSs extends to the early 1990s, as J.P. Morgan
bankers invented the first credit derivatives in 1994.14 The CDS market
peaked in 2007 at $57.8 trillion in notional value.15
CDSs might seem complicated, but their basic structure is
straightforward. A CDS is a contract between two parties, whereby one
party (the “protection buyer”) pays periodic fees in return for a promise
by the other (the “protection seller”) to compensate for the loss of value
of the reference obligation(s) in case of a credit event.16 The concept of
“credit event” is defined broadly to include events other than outright
nonpayment, and the parties can negotiate such events.17
Economically, CDSs resemble such contracts as credit insurance
and guaranties. 18 In one sense, because CDSs are two-party
relationships, they are more like insurance than guaranties, which
necessarily involve three parties. 19 Yet, if and insofar as CDSs can
legally be bought and sold without being exposed to the credit risk, they

14. See Gillian Tett, The Dream Machine: Invention of Credit Derivatives, FIN.
TIMES, Mar. 24, 2006, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/7886e2a8-b967-11da9d02-0000779e2340.html (tracking the invention and development of credit
derivatives).
15. See, e.g., Shadab, supra note 4, at 432–33. However, market size is an estimate
and subject to dispute regarding measurement methodology. See id.
16. See, e.g., ERIK BANKS, MORTON GLANTZ & PAUL SIEGEL, CREDIT
DERIVATIVES: TECHNIQUES TO MANAGE CREDIT RISK FOR FINANCIAL PROFESSIONALS 7
(2007) (“In a basic CDS the credit protection buyer pays the credit protection seller an
up-front or periodic fee in exchange for a compensatory payment that becomes due and
payable if the reference credit defaults during the life of the contract.”); see also
EDMUND PARKER, CREDIT DERIVATIVES: DOCUMENTING AND UNDERSTANDING CREDIT
DERIVATIVE PRODUCTS 27–30 (2007).
17. Anna Gelpern & Mitu Gulati, CDS Zombies, 13 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 347,
361–62 (2012); PARKER, supra note 16, at 28.
18. David Rule, The Credit Derivatives Market: Its Development and Possible
Implications for Financial Stability, FIN. STABILITY REV. 117, 118 (2001), available at
http://mng.ibu.edu.ba/assets/userfiles/mng/
feb2013/Reading%20Credit%20derivative%20markets.pdf.
19. See Robert D. Aicher, Deborah L. Cotton & T.K. Khan, Credit Enhancement:
Letters of Credit, Guaranties, Insurance and Swaps (The Clash of Cultures), 59 BUS.
LAW. 897, 921 (2004) (comparing guaranties and insurance).
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differ from insurance and become a form of betting on debtors’
default.20
The CDS market is over-the-counter (“OTC”), meaning that CDS
contracts are bilaterally negotiated and not publicly traded.21 However,
most CDSs adopt the standardized Master Agreements of ISDA.22 In
the case of default, settlement may take place either physically (by
accepting delivery of the underlying assets and paying par value) or in
cash (paying the difference between par value and market value after
default).23
B. REGULATORY ASSESSMENT
1. Benefits
Generally, the key benefits of CDSs derive from an improved
flexibility for managing certain risks and obtaining efficiency-enhancing
investment positions. 24 They are more flexible than traditional
guaranties or credit insurance because they are more easily customized
to suit particular risk profiles.25
There are also indirect benefits due to the positive externalities of
the CDS market. Given that the CDS market has become more liquid
and standardized, it has become easier to compare offers, and their

20. Frank Partnoy & David A. Skeel, Jr., The Promise and Perils of Credit
Derivatives, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 1019, 1021 (2007) (“[A] credit default swap is a private
contract in which private parties bet on a debt issuer’s bankruptcy.”).
21. For more on OTC derivatives, see, for example, Norman Menachem Feder,
Deconstructing Over-the-Counter Derivatives, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 677 (2002);
ALFRED STEINHERR, DERIVATIVES: THE WILD BEAST OF FINANCE 151–68 (2000).
22. Precise data is hard to find, but Braithwaite provides a range of evidence
suggesting that “an estimated 90 per cent of all OTC derivatives are governed by the
standardised documentation” of ISDA. See Braithwaite, supra note 13, at 784.
Regarding CDSs specifically, Gelpern & Gulati argue that “[i]t is hard to conceive of a
stronger and more successful trade group in charge of more important contracts than
ISDA, if success is to be measured by share of the contract market and importance by
dollar volume”. Gelpern & Gulati, supra note 17, at 355–56.
23. BANKS, GLANTZ & SIEGEL, supra note 16, at 33; see also Feder, supra note 21,
at 708–09 (describing cash-settlement and physical settlement in OTC derivatives).
24. STEINHERR, supra note 21, at 166–67.
25. Rule, supra note 18, at 118.
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pricing has probably become more efficient.26 Moreover, as CDS prices
have begun to be publicly quoted, they have become a source of timely
information on the market’s estimates on default probabilities.27
2. Risks and Concerns
However, CDSs have some shortcomings. First, they involve firmlevel risks, as CDSs may be transacted without fully understanding and
controlling the risks. 28 For example, selling CDS protection is
functionally equivalent to selling insurance, which is a highly risky
industry, and firms might not have a sufficient understanding or
adequate control procedures.29
Second, CDSs appear to negatively influence incentives. On the
one hand, they can harm borrower-lender relationships by reducing
screening and monitoring incentives.30 On the other hand, it is feared
that CDSs misalign incentives in the event of default.31 CDS value is
determined by credit events so that bondholders possessing CDS
protection may benefit from pushing distressed debtors into bankruptcy
(this is called the empty creditor problem).32 This can be socially costly

26. The lack of price transparency in OTC derivatives markets tends to mean that
dealers exploit less well-informed end users. See STEINHERR, supra note 21, at 157
(citing evidence that “OTC issuers may charge up to 45% over the theoretical option
price”).
27. See Mark J. Flannery, Joel F. Houston & Frank Partnoy, Credit Default Swap
Spreads as Viable Substitutes for Credit Ratings, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2085 (2010)
(proposing CDS spreads as a substitute for credit ratings).
28. Agasha Mugasha, The Secondary Market for Syndicated Loans: Loan Trading,
Credit Derivatives, and Collateralized Debt Obligations, 19 BANKING & FIN. L. REV.
199, 220 (2004) [hereinafter Mugasha, Syndicated Loans].
29. See id. at 221–23.
30. See Rym Ayadi & Patrick Behr, On the Necessity to Regulate Derivatives
Markets, 10 J. BANKING REG. 179, 187–89 (describing incentive issues associated with
credit derivatives).
31. David McIlroy, The Regulatory Issues Raised by Credit Default Swaps, 11 J.
BANKING REG. 303, 307–09 (2010) (discussing incentive issues of CDSs in the case of
default).
32. See generally Henry T.C. Hu & Bernard Black, Equity and Debt Decoupling
and Empty Voting II: Importance and Extensions, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 625 (2008)
(developing the theory of “empty voting” and “hidden (morphable) ownership”);
Patrick Bolton & Martin Oehmke, Credit Default Swaps and the Empty Creditor
Problem, 24 REV. FIN. STUD. 2617 (2011) (demonstrating formally that credit default
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given the wider social and economic ramifications of corporate
restructuring and bankruptcy.
Third, one motivation for CDSs is regulatory arbitrage, as they
give “access to credit markets which are otherwise restricted by
corporate statute or off-limits by regulation.”33 There is evidence that
much of the CDS market is connected to regulatory arbitrage.34 This is
problematic when those restrictions are reasonable. CDSs have enabled
financial institutions to take on more risks that are highly opaque to both
investors and regulators, so instead of improving the pricing of credit
risks, CDSs made it more difficult to correctly locate and price risks.35
Moreover, CDSs can be used for insider trading.36
Fourth, credit default swaps may give rise to negative externalities,
as spreading credit risk more widely has increased systemic risks.37 In
other words, credit risk transfer may improve risk management in
individual cases but has exacerbated system-wide instability because
difficulties in one sector extend to the entire market.38 The opacity of
the CDS market has also made it possible for huge amounts of risk to be
concentrated without the notice of other market participants or
regulators.39 Before the crisis that started in 2007, many commentators
downplayed the issue, 40 but subsequent events—particularly the AIG
fiasco—have proven otherwise.41
insurance reduces the incidence of strategic default, but causes an inefficiently high
incidence of costly bankruptcy).
33. André Scheerer, Credit Derivatives: An Overview of Regulatory Initiatives in
the Unites States and Europe, 5 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 149, 151 (2000). On the
notion of regulatory arbitrage, see Frank Partnoy, Financial Derivatives and the Costs
of Regulatory Arbitrage, 22 J. CORP. L. 211, 227 (1997) [hereinafter Partnoy,
Regulatory Arbitrage].
34. See Ayadi & Behr, supra note 30, at 186 (describing the principal motivations
for using credit derivatives).
35. See McIlroy, supra note 31, at 305–07 (discussing the opacity and complexity
created by CDSs).
36. See generally Viral V. Acharya & Timothy C. Johnson, Insider Trading in
Credit Derivatives 84 J. FIN. ECON. 110 (2007); see also Juurikkala, EU Short Selling
Regulation, supra note 11, at 313–15 (describing regulatory reactions).
37. For a detailed study on the notion of systemic risk in financial markets, see
Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEORGETOWN L. J. 193, 200 (2008).
38. See Ayadi & Behr, supra note 30, at 189–91.
39. See McIlroy, supra note 31, at 309; Shadab, supra note 4, at 444–52
(discussing overconcentration of CDS exposure).
40. See, e.g., Tim Weithers, Credit Derivatives, Macro Risks, and Systemic Risks,
FED. RES. BANK ATLANTA ECON. REV. 43 (2007), available at
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Fifth, unrestricted opportunities for betting on debtors’ default can
destabilize distressed markets. 42 In theory, these opportunities might
improve market efficiency, but in practice, there is little empirical
support for this, and many borrowers have suffered from CDS
speculation.43 In informationally imperfect markets, CDSs may also be
used to generate destabilizing signals, and regulators have been
concerned about market manipulation.44
C. LEGAL ALTERNATIVES, UNCERTAINTY, AND MYTHS
Before a detailed analysis of CDSs as either insurance or
derivatives, it is necessary to place the issues in a bigger picture. Before
the Dodd-Frank Act, the legal characterization of CDSs was open to
debate, and practically no case law clarified the matter.45 In two U.S.
cases, the courts pronounced obiter dicta on the nature of CDSs, one

http://www.frbatlanta.org/filelegacydocs/erq407_weithers.pdf (discussing systemic risk
and arguing that risk dispersion has reduced systemic risk in banking, although
admitting that risk concentration in hedge funds could be a problem).
41. On the AIG case, see William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The AIG Bailout, 66 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 943 (2009), http://law.wlu.edu/deptimages/Law%20Review/663Sjostrom.pdf; FCIC REPORT, supra note 1, at 50, 139–42, 200–02, 243–44, 265–74,
344–52; Shadab, supra note 4, at 447–52.
42. See Juurikkala, EU Short Selling Regulation, supra note 11, at 325–28
(discussing empirical evidence).
43. Id. at 325–26; see also Adam B. Ashcraft & João A.C. Santos, Has the CDS
Market Lowered the Cost of Corporate Debt? 56 J. MONETARY ECON. 514 (2009)
(finding insignificant benefits overall, and major adverse effects on risky and
informationally opaque borrowers).
44. Juurikkala, EU Short Selling Regulation, supra note 11, at 328; see also
Testimony Concerning Turmoil in U.S. Credit Markets: Recent Actions Regarding
Government Sponsored Entities, Investment Banks and Other Financial Institutions
Before S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. 1 (2008)
(statement of Christopher Cox, Chairman of the SEC), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/
2008/ts092308cc.htm (explaining an enforcement investigation and referring to “the
significant opportunities that exist for manipulation in the $58 trillion CDS market,
which is completely lacking in transparency and completely unregulated”).
45. See Schwartz, supra note 4, at 173 (citing data on the scarcity of CDS
litigation); Aicher, Cotton & Khan, supra note 19, at 956 (noting the lack of decided
CDS cases).
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likening them to insurance 46 and the other differentiating them, 47 but
neither decision ruled on the classification issue.48
The Potts opinion of 1997 supports the derivatives-based view,
arguing that CDSs were not insurance in English law.49 That view is
carefully examined later, 50 but even supposing it to be correct in
arguendo, the opinion does not explain what CDSs are. As explained in
this section, the matter continues to remain open in many respects.
1. CDSs as Securities: Early Opinions and Contrary Legislation
According to one U.S. attorney, “[u]ntil December 2000, the
prevailing opinion among practitioners was that CDSs were securities
under the Securities Act” because “a CDS was viewed as a put on an
That view is doubtful, because
evidence of indebtedness.” 51
economically, a CDS is definitely not a put on an evidence of

46. See Merrill Lynch Int’l v. XL Capital Assurance et al., 564 F. Supp. 2d 298,
300 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“A credit default swap is an arrangement similar to an insurance
contract. The buyer of protection . . . pays a periodic fee, like an insurance premium, to
the seller of protection . . . , in exchange for compensation in the event that the insured
security experiences default.”).
47. See AON Fin. Prods., Inc. v. Societe Generale, 476 F.3d 90, 96 (2d Cir. 2007)
(“CDS agreements are thus significantly different from insurance contracts.”).
Interestingly, the court cited an ISDA amicus curiae brief stating that CDSs “do not,
and are not meant to, indemnify the buyer of protection against loss. Rather, CDS
contracts allow parties to ‘hedge’ risk by buying and selling risks at different prices and
with varying degrees of correlation.” Id. However, this generic description evades the
question of how CDSs are structured and does not differentiate them from insurance. In
fact, the court’s own definition of CDSs was plainer: “[c]redit default swaps are a
method by which one party (the protection buyer) transfers risk to another party (the
protection seller).” Id.
48. Like most CDS cases, these two cases were concerned with whether a credit
event had occurred within the meaning of the terms of the contract. See id.; see also
Merrill Lynch Int’l, 564 F. Supp. 2d at 298.
49. See ROBIN POTTS, CREDIT DERIVATIVES: OPINION (1997) (on file with author)
[hereinafter POTTS OPINION]; see, e.g., Kimball-Stanley, supra note 3, at 246–47.
50. Infra Part II.C.
51. Sjostrom, supra note 41, at 984; see also Adam W. Glass, CFMA Brings Legal
Certainty, but Additional Liability for Credit Derivatives: Part One, LINKLATERS, 1
(2001), available at http://www.linklaters.com/pdfs/publications/us/cfmaapril2001.pdf.
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indebtedness. 52 Moreover, many CDSs were probably transacted as
unregulated swaps rather than securities.53
In 2000 the Commodity Futures Modernization Act (“CFMA”),54
the first piece of U.S. legislation explicitly addressing CDSs, removed
the potential of characterizing CDSs as securities by determining that
swap agreements, including CDSs, are not securities under the federal
securities laws. 55 The act also excluded the regulation of CDSs as
commodity derivatives, treating them as exempted swap transactions.56
However, CFMA did not exclude the application of insurance laws to
transactions that resemble insurance.57
2. Letter of Credit, Guaranty, or Financial Guaranty Insurance?
Another view, advanced in light of English law, is that CDSs are
analogous to a letter of credit or a third-party guarantee.58 However,
even if some similarities exist, the classification is inaccurate because
letters of credit and third-party guarantees are fundamentally three-party
relationships whereas CDSs are structured as two-party relationships

52. Evidence of indebtedness could influence CDS prices, but payments under
CDSs are determined by specific credit events.
53. There is no hard data on the early development of the market for CDSs, and
moreover, “[t]here is substantial uncertainty surrounding the definition of ‘security.’”
Frank Partnoy, The Shifting Contours of Global Derivatives Regulation, 22 U. PA. J.
INT’L ECON. L. 421, 495 n.26 (2001) [hereinafter Partnoy, Derivatives Regulation].
54. Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000) (codified in scattered sections of 7,
11, 12, and 15 U.S.C.); see also infra Part III.B.5.
55. See Sjostrom, supra note 41, at 984–85; see also Noah L. Wynkoop, Note, The
Unregulables? The Perilous Confluence of Hedge Funds and Credit Derivatives, 76
FORDHAM L. REV. 3095, 3099 (2008).
56. See Sjostrom, supra note 41, at 986; see also Wynkoop, supra note 55, at 3100.
57. See Hearing to Review the Role of Credit Derivatives in the US Economy:
Testimony to the H. Comm. On Agric. 110th Cong. 4 (2008), available at
http://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/speeches_ins/sp0811201.pdf (testimony of Eric Dinallo,
N.Y. Superintendent of Ins.) (explaining the effects of CFMA and highlighting that the
insurance issue was left open); see also Schwartz, supra note 4, at 173 (noting that “the
state of insurance regulation remains unsettled in many places”).
58. See Schuyler K. Henderson, Regulation of Credit Derivatives: To What Effect
and for Whose Benefit? Part 6, 8 J. INT’L BANKING & FIN. L. 480, 481–82 (2009)
[hereinafter Henderson, Regulation of Credit Derivatives].
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whereby payment depends on external and flexibly negotiable credit
events.59
According to one representative of U.S. insurance legislators, CDSs
are really a form of financial guaranty insurance. 60 The evolving
attitude of insurance regulators is examined later, but it should be noted
that financial guaranty insurance is a novel and peculiar form of
insurance that is normally tripartite, like a letter of credit written by an
insurer.61 Therefore, it seems inaccurate to treat all CDSs as financial
guaranty insurance, although statutory definitions of financial guaranty
insurance are broad,62 so some CDSs might be caught.
3. New York Insurance Law: The Misquoted Article 69
While there is uncertainty, there are also myths. One of them is the
common, but erroneous, belief that the possibility of classifying CDSs
as insurance was excluded in New York State in 2004, when Article 69
of the New York Insurance Law (dealing with financial guaranty
insurance) was amended to define some aspects of CDSs. 63 Several
commentators claimed that the amendment definitively excluded CDSs
from insurance regulation, citing § 6901(j-1): “the making of [a] credit
default swap does not constitute the doing of an insurance business.”64
Thus, Shadab writes that New York “in 2004 codified that position [that
CDSs do not qualify as insurance contracts] in Article 69 of the New
59. See supra notes 17–19 and accompanying text; see also Aicher, Cotton &
Khan, supra note 19, at 899–900 (describing letters of credit), 910–11 (guaranties),
954–56 (CDSs). Letter of credit and guaranties differ in that the first is subject to the
“independence principle” whereas the latter are strictly secondary obligations. Id. at
902. There is long-standing confusion regarding the legal differentiation of different
forms of credit enhancement. Id. at 898–99. The strictly two-party nature of CDSs is
implicitly acknowledged by Henderson, Regulation of Credit Derivatives, supra note
58, at 482 (“It is a fundamental cornerstone of the CDS market that performance is
based on its contractual terms, objectively applied . . . .”).
60. See Hearing to Review Derivatives Legislation Before the H. Comm. On Agric.,
111th Cong. 147–48 (2009), available at http://agriculture.house.gov/sites/
republicans.agriculture.house.gov/files/testimony/111/111-1.pdf (statement of the Hon.
Joseph D. Morelle, N.Y. Assemb. And Chairman, Standing Comm. on Ins., testifying
on behalf of the Nat’l Conference of Ins. Legislators).
61. See Aicher, Cotton & Khan, supra note 19, at 930–32.
62. See id. at 934–35.
63. N.Y. INS. LAW § 6901 (McKinney 2014).
64. See, e.g., Kimball-Stanley, supra note 3, at 252 (citing exactly this).
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York Insurance Law.” 65 Schwartz states that “New York updated its
insurance laws to exclude CDS in 2004”66 and that this “permanently
quelled the worries of those who feared insurance treatment for CDS.”67
Kimball-Stanley comments: “The statute is hardly a convincing analysis
of the legal issues involved in such a statement; but it is effective
nonetheless.”68
However, this is all a misunderstanding because the statutory
sentence has been taken out of context. The original paragraph defines
the meaning of CDSs for the purposes of New York Insurance Law and
adds a caveat to highlight that the definition only applies on the
condition that the agreement is not deemed to be an insurance contract.
“Credit default swap” means an agreement referencing the credit
derivative definitions published from time to time by the
International Swap and Derivatives Association, Inc. or otherwise
acceptable to the superintendent, pursuant to which a party agrees to
compensate another party in the event of a payment default by,
insolvency of, or other adverse credit event in respect of, an issuer of
a specified security or other obligation; provided that such
agreement does not constitute an insurance contract and the making
of such credit default swap does not constitute the doing of an
69
insurance business.

The original purpose of the last sentence is to warn that the
application of insurance law to CDSs had not been settled. Insurance
Superintendent Eric R. Dinallo emphasized this interpretation and
clarified the meaning of the paragraph in September 2008: “[t]hus,
provided that the making of the CDS itself ‘does not constitute the doing
of an insurance business,’ Insurance Law . . . permits FGIs [financial

65.
66.

Shadab, supra note 4, at 429.
Schwartz, supra note 4, at 173; see also Sjostrom, supra note 41, at 988
(asserting that “[t]his [that CDSs have not been subject to insurance regulations] was
made crystal clear by the state of New York in 2004 when it amended its insurance
laws specifically to exclude CDSs from coverage.)”
67. Schwartz, supra note 4, at 183; see also Charles K. Whitehead, Reframing
Financial Regulation, 90 B. U. L. REV. 1, 34 (2010) (“In New York . . . most of
AIGFP’s [credit default] swaps were expressly excluded from insurance regulation.”).
68. Kimball-Stanley, supra note 3, at 252.
69. N.Y. INS. LAW § 6901(j-1) (McKinney 2014) (emphasis added).
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guaranty insurance companies] to issue insurance policies that guarantee
payments by transformers or other parties pursuant to such a CDS.”70
In other words, Article 69 states that insurers could sell financial
guaranty insurance to guarantee non-insurance CDSs, implying that
some CDSs could be insurance and their differentiation must be
determined independently.
4. Recent Reforms and the Ongoing Relevance of the Insurance
Question
In the U.S., the Dodd-Frank Act somewhat clarified the legal status
of CDSs by excluding their characterization as insurance and imposing
mandatory clearing for most CDSs.71 However, the solution is puzzling,
as it depends on a paradoxical concept of “swap” that departs from
financial definitions, which may cover many insurance contracts.72 The
insurance question has ongoing policy relevance because Dodd-Frank
fails to address many regulatory concerns and raises new ones.73
The insurance issue is, thus, more immediately relevant in Europe,
including the UK due to its dominant market in credit derivatives.74 In
Europe, the common assumption that CDSs are derivatives has no clear
legal foundation. For example, the new regulation imposing mandatory
clearing for many OTC derivatives (commonly known as the European
Market Infrastructure Regulation or “EMIR”)75 is commonly assumed to
cover CDSs, but in fact, it makes no explicit reference to CDSs.
70. Circular Letter No. 19, Re: “Best Practices” for Financial Guaranty Insurers
from Eric R. Dinallo, Superintendent of the N.Y. Ins. Dep’t, to all authorized financial
guaranty
insurers
(Sept.
22,
2008),
available
at
http://www.dfs.ny.gov/insurance/circltr/2008/cl08_19.htm; see also Sherri Venokur,
Matthew Magidson & Adam M. Singer, Comparing Credit Default Swaps to Insurance
Contracts: Did the New York State Insurance Department Get It Right?, 28 No. 11
FUTURES & DERIVATIVES L. REPORT 1, 4 (2008) (“[I]f the CDS itself does not constitute
an insurance contract or the doing of an insurance business, then an FGI is permitted to
issue an insurance policy that guarantees payments by a transformer or other party
pursuant to such CDS.”).
71. See infra Part III.C for a detailed discussion.
72. See infra notes 384–78 and accompanying text.
73. See infra Part III.C.2.
74. PARKER, supra note 16, at 13.
75. Regulation 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council on OTC
Derivatives, Central Counterparties and Trade Repositories, 2012 O.J. (L 201) 1 (July
4, 2012).
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Instead, it defines “derivative” or “derivative contract” by referring back
to a list of instruments attached to the MiFID Directive.76 This list does
not mention CDSs either, only generically referring to “[d]erivative
instruments for the transfer of credit risk.”77 If this is the legal basis for
arguing that CDSs are not insurance, it is utterly inadequate because
invoking it as a statutory classification would therefore be circular.
Thus, the non-specific expression in MiFID does not provide
demarcation criteria but simply presupposes the prior legal classification
as a derivative.
II. CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS AS INSURANCE CONTRACTS
Many specialists acknowledge that CDSs seem like insurance. 78
This Part outlines the implications of insurance regulation and concludes
that CDSs are legally insurance because CDSs fall within standard
definitions and tests and contrary arguments seem to be based on
misunderstandings of insurance law. The development of the thinking
of U.S. insurance regulators is also analyzed.
A. THE CONSEQUENCES OF INSURANCE REGULATION
Insurance regulation carries major practical significance. First,
selling insurance without a proper license may render protection sellers
civilly and criminally liable.79 The rules vary between jurisdictions, but
generally, “if credit default swaps are deemed insurance by an insurance
regulator, a protection seller could be subject to criminal prosecution,
substantial fines, and forfeiture of its corporate charter unless it

76.
77.

Id. at Art. 2(5).
Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on
Markets in Financial Instruments, 2004 O.J. (L145) 1, Annex 1, Section C(8) (Apr. 21,
2004).
78. See, e.g., MARK J.P. ANSON, CREDIT DERIVATIVES 44 (1999) (“This type of
swap may be properly classified as credit insurance.”); FRANK SKINNER, PRICING AND
HEDGING INTEREST AND CREDIT RISK SENSITIVE INSTRUMENTS 280 (2005) (“Credit
default swaps . . . are actually default insurance.”).
79. David Z. Nirenberg & Richard J. Hoffman, Are Credit Default Swaps
Insurance?, 3 DERIVATIVES REP. 7, 8 (2001).
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maintained the requisite licenses.”80 The protection buyer may also be
able to recover the money paid or any loss sustained.81
Second, authorization to sell insurance implies a range of
regulatory burdens, including loss reserves, capitalization, compulsory
disclosures, and investment restrictions.82 Therefore, firms may wish to
avoid the application of insurance law.83 Third, insurance law in most
jurisdictions limits the freedom of protection buyers by imposing, the
requirement of insurable interest, which limits speculative risk-taking.84
Fourth, insurance contracts are normally subject to the principle of
utmost good faith, which requires both parties to disclose all information
that would influence the judgment of a prudent insurer. 85 The
application of this principle varies greatly among jurisdictions and types
of insurance.86 In the U.S. in particular, there is “a substantial consumer
protection element of the law governing insurance.”87

80. Id.; see, e.g., N.Y. INS. LAW § 1101(a)(2) (McKinney 2014). In the U.K., the
regime under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 is complicated because a
person may be authorized by the Financial Services Authority (FSA), but if the
permission does not extend to insurance, the breach is only subject to FSA sanctions,
including criminal penalties. See JOANNA BENJAMIN, FINANCIAL LAW ¶¶ 10.17–10.20
(2007).
81. See MALCOLM CLARKE, POLICIES AND PERCEPTIONS OF INSURANCE LAW IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 60 (2007) (describing U.K. rules); BENJAMIN, supra note 80,
at 10.18.
82. See, e.g., CLARKE, supra note 81, at 61–65 (describing a range of duties falling
upon insurers in the UK); ROBERT H. JERRY II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 112–
23 (3rd ed. 2001) (describing statutory controls in the U.S.). Taxation and accounting
rules are also specific to insurance. See, e.g., HM REVENUE & CUSTOMS, GENERAL
INSURANCE MANUAL (2011), available at http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/gimanual.
83. See Jan Hellner, The Scope of Insurance Regulation: What Is Insurance for
Purposes of Regulation?, 12 AM. J. COMP. L. 494, 494 (1963).
84. See infra Part II.E.
85. See CLARKE, supra note 81, at 98–116 (discussing this principle critically).
86. Id.
87. Thomas Lee Hazen, Disparate Regulatory Schemes for Parallel Activities:
Securities Regulation, Derivatives Regulation, Gambling, and Insurance, 24 ANN. REV.
BANKING & FIN. L. 375, 431–32 (2005).
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B. DEMARCATING INSURANCE
1. Legal Definitions
Definitions cannot definitively demarcate the scope of insurance
law, but are necessary as a matter of first impression. Although there is
some variation among the conventional legal definitions of insurance, it
is argued in what follows that the definitions agree on the fundamentals,
and those fundamental elements embrace all or many CDSs.88
In the U.S., Black’s Law Dictionary defines insurance as a
“contract by which one party (the insurer) undertakes to indemnify
another party (the insured) against risk of loss, damage, or liability
arising from the occurrence of some specified contingency.”89 In the
U.K., some statutes deal with insurance law, but the demarcation of
insurance continues to be determined by common law and the
regulators’ interpretation thereof.90 In the landmark case of Prudential
Insurance Co. v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue, Judge Channell
describes insurance:
A contract of insurance, then, must be a contract for the payment of
a sum of money, or for some corresponding benefit such as the
rebuilding of a house or the repairing of a ship, to become due on the
happening of an event, which event must have some [degree] of
uncertainty about it and must be of a character more or less adverse
91
to the interest of the person effecting the insurance.

88. This discussion is limited to U.S. and English law because they are the leading
jurisdictions for CDS markets. The demarcation of insurance law does not appear
fundamentally different in other jurisdictions although there are important differences
in the details of insurance regulation.
89. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 870 (9th ed. 2009). New York Insurance Law
provides a longer but essentially similar definition. N.Y. INS. LAW § 1101(a)
(McKinney 2014).
90. See FIN. SERVS. AUTH., FSA HANDBOOK: PERIMETER GUIDANCE MANUAL
(PERG)
¶¶
6.3.2,
6.5.2
(2012),
available
at
http://media.fsahandbook.info/pdf/PERG.pdf [hereinafter FSA, PERG]; CLARKE, supra
note 81, at 349.
91. Prudential Ins. Co. v IRC, [1904] 2 KB 658, 663. According to the FSA,
Prudential is the best statement of the common law. FSA, PERG, supra note 90, ¶
6.5.1.

2014]

DECODING THE MYSTERY OF
CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS

443

There are three fundamental elements of insurance contracts:
payment, uncertainty, and adverseness (interest).92 It is evident that the
broad definitions would include CDSs, at least in some cases, as many
commentators acknowledge that a “CDS certainly appears to fall within
this definition [in Black’s Law Dictionary].”93 Even Schwartz, who is
critical of insurance law, concludes that “on their face, these [New
York] statutes define insurance contracts such that CDS[s]—at least
those with exogenous credit events—could be subject to insurance
regulation.” 94 Attempts to downplay the issue refer to non-legal
definitions of insurance, such as those highlighting risk pooling,95 which
is important for insurance economics but not a legal criterion for
demarcating insurance law, so these arguments lack legal merit.
2. Borderline Cases
Definitions are not the final word, though. Demarcations must be
determined by courts and regulators, which are skeptical of generic
definitions “because definitions tend sometimes to obscure and
occasionally to exclude that which ought to be included.” 96 Even
statutes that provide a definition should not be blindly relied upon, as
“the approach through formal definition leads to innumerable difficulties
and, if taken seriously, unfortunate results.”97
There is no simple way to determine borderline cases.98 Courts at
common law have developed a range of criteria based on the

92. THE LAW COMMISSION & THE SCOTTISH LAW COMMISSIONS, INSURABLE
INTEREST, 2008, Issue Paper 4, ¶ 7.19 [hereinafter LAW COMMISSIONS, INSURABLE
INTEREST], available at http://www.scotlawcom.gov.uk/
download_file/view/203/107. For similar definitions, see, for example, E.R. HARDY
IVAMY, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE LAW 3–4 (6th ed. 1993); NICHOLAS LEIGHJONES, JOHN BIRDS & DAVID OWEN, MACGILLIVRAY ON INSURANCE LAW ¶ 1-1 (10th
ed. 2003).
93. See Sjostrom, supra note 41, at 987.
94. Schwartz, supra note 4, at 181.
95. See Henderson, Credit Derivatives Are Not “Insurance,” supra note 3, at 16.
96. Department of Trade and Industry v St. Christopher Motorists Association
(1974) 1 All ER 395, at 396–97; see also CLARKE, supra note 81, at 347–52 (discussing
the limits of definitions).
97. Hellner, supra note 83, at 495.
98. Id. at 500–04 (discussing various tests and their limits).
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peculiarities of new cases.99 However, the criteria seem to add little to
the present discussion, as many of them are trivial and easily fulfilled in
CDSs.100 Only two criteria raise questions for CDSs. One, that “the
insured event must be one that is adverse to the policyholder,”101 is only
relevant for some (so-called uncovered or “naked”) CDSs.102
Another potentially relevant criterion is the “major or primary
purpose test” developed in some U.S. cases, according to which, “where
the major purpose of a contract is other than to indemnify the promise,
there is no insurance.”103 However, the validity of this test is doubtful,
as it is contradicted by some cases and “cannot prevail as a general
test.”104 U.K. regulators expressly abolished the test: “The contract must
be characterised as a whole and not according to its ‘dominant purpose’
or the relative weight of its ‘insurance content’.”105 In any case, this test
might not matter for CDSs because the only purpose of CDSs is
precisely to indemnify, e.g., to recover the loss of reference asset value
due to default or another credit event.106
Some argue that “attempts at evasion of insurance regulation
should not be tolerated,” giving rise to a kind of positive presumption in
favor of regulation. 107 This is relevant to CDSs because the very
language of “swaps” may be interpreted as a camouflage.108
99. See, e.g., CLARKE, supra note 81, at 350 (describing features highlighted by
English courts); Hellner, supra note 83, 500–12 (discussing U.S. cases).
100. For example, CLARKE, supra note 81, at 350, lists the following criteria: the
provision of insurance must be a business of a certain degree of regularity (even if
insurance is just one part of its business); the insurer’s promise to pay must be “in
money or in kind”; “the alleged insurer must be legally (e.g., contractually) bound to
pay the money or provide the benefit in kind . . . and the beneficiary must have a legally
enforceable right to receive it”; and “the benefit is due only if a specified insured event
occurs. Moreover, at the time of contracting, it must be uncertain whether the specified
event will occur.”
101. Id.
102. See infra Part II.E.2.
103. Hellner, supra note 83, at 502.
104. Id.
105. FSA, PERG, supra note 90, ¶ 6.5.4(3) (citing Fuji Finance Inc. v. Aetna Life
Insurance Co. Ltd [1997] Ch. 173 (C.A.)); see also id. ¶ 6.6.7.(2).
106. This will be discussed later in detail. See infra Part II.F.1. The point of the
major purpose test is not to scrutinize the motivations of the insured party (which in
CDS transactions may be speculative), but to distinguish contracts which have only a
marginal insurance element. See Hellner, supra note 83, at 502–03.
107. See Hellner, supra note 83, at 503–04 (discussing this argument).
108. See infra Part II.D.3.
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3. UK Financial Services Authority Guidelines
In the U.K., the difficulty of delineating the boundaries of
insurance law has prompted the Financial Services Authority (“FSA”)—
which supervised both securities and insurance industries—to provide
further guidance. 109 This guidance is not conclusive and does not
explicitly discuss CDSs, but it corroborates the impression that English
insurance law covers CDSs.
First, the FSA lists transactions that are unlikely to be regarded as
insurance. These include contracts that appear to be “pre-payment for
services to be rendered in response to a future contingency”;110 contracts
of “periodic maintenance of goods or facilities”;111 and contracts under
which “the provider stands ready to provide services on the occurrence
of a future contingency, on condition that the services actually provided
are paid for by the recipient at a commercial rate.”112 CDSs resemble
none of these transactions.
Second, in terms of affirmative criteria, the FSA highlights the
“assumption of risk” by the insurer as “an important descriptive feature
of all contracts of insurance.”113 For the FSA, the assumption of risk has
the same meaning as the “transfer of risk.” 114 This is precisely the
fundamental element of CDSs. It does not matter if the provider “trades
without any risk,”115 as may be the case with an investment bank acting
as a CDS intermediary.
With respect to borderline cases, the FSA notes that insurance law
is more likely to apply “if the amount payable by the recipient under the
contract is calculated by reference to either or both of the probability of
occurrence or likely severity of the uncertain event.”116 This is the case
for CDSs, at least in practice, because CDS premiums or spreads reflect

109. FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, THE IDENTIFICATION OF CONTRACTS OF
INSURANCE
(2004)
[hereinafter
FSA,
INSURANCE],
available
at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/policy/ps04_19.pdf; this document updated the guidance in
FSA, PERG, supra note 90, at Chapter 6.
110. FSA, PERG, supra note 90, ¶ 6.6.3.
111. Id. ¶ 6.6.4.
112. Id. ¶ 6.6.5.
113. Id. ¶ 6.6.2.
114. Id. ¶ 6.6.2(1).
115. Id. ¶ 6.6.2(3).
116. Id. ¶ 6.6.8(1).
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expectations of probability and severity of credit events.117 Also, the
FSA states that a contract is less likely to be insurance “if it requires the
provider to assume a speculative risk (i.e. a risk carrying the possibility
of either profit or loss) rather than a pure risk (i.e. a risk of loss
only).”118 CDSs transfer the risk of loss only because credit events are
always downside risks in terms of reference asset value.119
In the FSA guidance, the only factor against insurance
characterization of CDSs is that a contract is more likely to be insurance
if it “is described as insurance and contains terms that are consistent
with its classification as a contract of insurance, for example, obligations
of the utmost good faith.”120 However, this is not the case for CDSs.
The guidance goes on to note that what matters is the substance, and the
contract “does not cease to be a contract of insurance simply because the
terms included are not usual insurance terms.” 121 The question is
asymmetric:
Although there are good reasons for submitting anything that is
frankly called insurance to insurance regulation, since the public
might otherwise be misled, the test is clearly unsuitable when
applied to business which is not called insurance for then an easy
way to avoid the burden of regulation would be to use another
122
name.

Therefore, the use of insurance language renders insurance
characterization more likely, but the avoidance of such language does
not make insurance characterization unlikely.

117. BANKS, GLANTZ & SIEGEL, supra note 16, at 34 (“The premium is a function of
various factors, including time to maturity, probability of reference credit default,
expected recovery rate given default[,]” etc.).
118. FSA, PERG, supra note 90, ¶ 6.6.8(2).
119. See id.
120. Id. ¶ 6.6.8(3).
121. Id. ¶ 6.6.8(4).
122. Hellner, supra note 83, at 500.
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C. POTTS OPINION: THE LEADING ARGUMENT THAT CDSS ARE NOT
INSURANCE
1. The Potts Opinion and Its Importance
The argument for insurance recharacterization seems strong, but
there is a persistent belief that CDSs are not insurance. This belief goes
back to a legal opinion on credit derivatives penned in 1997 by Robin
Potts QC in London for ISDA.123 After examining the principles, Potts
concluded:
I think that credit default options [sic] plainly differ from contracts
of insurance in the following critical respects:(a) the payment obligation is not conditional on the payee’s
sustaining a loss or having a risk of loss; [and]
(b) the contract is thus not one which seeks to protect an insurable
interest on the part of the payee. His rights do not depend on the
124
existence of any insurable interest.

Potts went on to admit that “the economic effect of certain credit
derivatives can be similar to” insurance but “is not the test to be applied
to the characterisation of the transaction.” 125 Instead, the question
depends on the intended rights and obligations specified in the
contract.126 Potts also recommended that the contract include a clause
insisting that the parties wish the obligations to exist, regardless of
whether the protection buyer suffers or is exposed to a loss, so that the
transaction would not be an insurance contract.127
Before critically analyzing Potts’ reasoning, it is worth noting its
importance. In the words of an anonymous ISDA representative, “there
would have been no market at all” in CDSs in the absence of the Potts
opinion. 128 ISDA has repeated the core of Potts’s argument on

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

See POTTS OPINION, supra note 49, ¶ 1.
Id. ¶ 5.
Id.
See id.
See id. ¶ 6.
Isabelle Huault & Hélène Rainelli-Le Montagner, Market Shaping as an
Answer to Ambiguities: The Case of Credit Derivatives, 30 ORG. STUD. 549, 560
(2009).
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numerous occasions.129 The rhetorical weight of the Potts opinion has
been so impressive that in a 2006 letter to the English Law Commission,
ISDA Senior Policy Director Richard Metcalfe invoked the authority of
the “widespread acceptance of the so-called ‘Potts opinion,’” which had
come to represent “current market consensus.”130
In reality, though, that widespread acceptance was driven by a
group of London-based banking lawyers basically repeating the Potts
opinion in a range of publications.131 For example, a group of Allen &
Overy solicitors—connected with the Potts opinion itself—made the
same argument in 1997. 132 In 2001, Norton Rose lawyers advanced
essentially the same argument, 133 and in 2003, ISDA documentation
expert Paul Harding referred to the Potts opinion as definitive. 134
Likewise, Joanna Benjamin in 2007 wrote—while expressing doubts
about the accuracy of Potts’ analysis—that “given the degree of
authority commanded by the Potts opinion in the financial markets, and
given also the importance of commercial expectations in characterising
financial contracts, the opinion may now be regarded as conclusive.”135
2. Mixed Reception
Determining whether the Potts opinion is conclusive involves
complex legal issues that the following sections examine in detail, but

129. See, e.g., Letter from Robert G. Pickel, Exec. Dir. & CEO, ISDA, to Ernst N.
Csiszar, President, NAIC & Robert Esson, Senior Manager, Global Ins. Mkts., NAIC
(Feb. 23, 2004), available at http://www.isda.org/c_and_a/pdf/NAICltr022304.pdf
(arguing that weather derivatives are not insurance).
130. Letter from Richard Metcalfe, Int’l Swaps & Derivatives Ass’n, to the Law
Comm’n (Apr. 18, 2006), available at http://www.isda.org (responding to Insurance
Contract Law: A Joint Scoping Paper).
131. See, e.g., Mugasha, Syndicated Loans, supra note 28, at 222–23 (summarizing
arguments similar to the Potts opinion).
132. David Benton, Patrick Devine & Philip Jarvis, Credit Derivatives Are Not
Insurance Products, 16 INT’L FIN. L. REV. 29, 30–31 (1997). Benton was one of the
two Allen & Overy Instructing Solicitors acting for ISDA in requesting the Potts
opinion. See Allen & Overy, Instructions to Counsel, at 10 (May 19, 1997) [hereinafter
Potts Instructions] (on file with author).
133. Maria Ross & Charlotte Davies, Credit Derivatives and Insurance – a World
Apart?, in LLOYDS, ARTWORK 2 (2001).
134. PAUL C. HARDING, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE 2003 ISDA CREDIT
DERIVATIVES DEFINITIONS 18–19 (2004).
135. BENJAMIN, supra note 80, at 142 n.426.
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generally, the assessments of Harding and Benjamin seem hasty at best.
The Potts opinion is famous, but legally, it is only a private opinion. Its
acceptance by the market—that is, a financial market keen to free itself
from the shackles of regulation—is hardly surprising, and certainly does
not render it conclusive.
Moreover, the acceptance of the Potts opinion has been hugely
exaggerated. In fact, already in 1998, Professor Hudson wrote that
credit derivatives basically provide “a form of insurance policy for the
buyer”136 and that they imply “a number of areas of potential liability
where dealers are, in terms, providing insurance to their clients.”137 In
2000, John Jakeways advanced a more nuanced position on the
insurance question. In his view, the answer should depend on the
specific terms of each contract, and, while many credit derivatives might
escape insurance law, nothing certain could be said.138 Ali and de Vries
Robbé, in 2005, likewise highlighted the continuing legal risk that credit
derivatives might be recharacterized as insurance.139 Finally, Benjamin
Saunders, in 2010, argued that at least some CDSs—”for example a
bank entering a CDS to protect against borrower default”—are “a form
of indemnity insurance.”140
Just as academic opinion has diverged from Potts on many points,
Potts’ reception by regulators has been equally mixed. In the U.K., the
FSA explicitly commented on the Potts opinion in 2002, arguing that the
Potts opinion should not be relied upon. 141 The same suspicion was
136. Alastair Hudson, Seller Liability for Credit Derivatives 5 (July 1998), available
at http://www.alastairhudson.com/financelaw/sellerliabilitycreditderivs.pdf.
137. Id. at 14.
138. John Jakeways, The Legal Nature of Credit Derivatives, in CREDIT
DERIVATIVES: LAW, REGULATION AND ACCOUNTING ISSUES 47, 51–53 (Alastair Hudson
ed., 1999). It seems correct that the issue depends on the specific terms of the contract.
However, Jakeways also suggested that the basis for avoiding insurance law is that the
principal object of the transaction is other than to insure. Id. at 54–55. But as we have
seen, the principal object test is doubtful and has been expressly rejected in the U.K.
See supra notes 103–05 and accompanying text.
139. See Paul U. Ali, Credit Derivatives and Synthetic Securitizations: Innovation
and Fragility, 20 BANKING & FIN. L. REV. 293, 308 (2005); Paul U. Ali & Jan Job de
Vries Robbé, New Frontiers in Credit Derivatives, 6 J. BANKING REG. 175, 181 (2005).
140. Saunders, supra note 6, at 435.
141. See FIN. SERVS. AUTH., CROSS-SECTOR RISK TRANSFERS, Annex B, at 2 (2002),
available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/discussion/dp11.pdf [hereinafter FSA, RISK
TRANSFERS]. The reasons were: (i) some contracts may not have “no intention to
insure” clauses; (ii) the reference event may have been defined in such a way that it is
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repeated by the English and Scottish Law Commissions’ 2008 study on
insurable interest.142 In the U.S., ISDA’s Potts-like argumentation was
initially accepted by insurance regulators143 but after the financial crisis,
was more carefully scrutinized and then rejected.144
D. FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN INSURANCE LAW AND CDSS
This section examines the arguments of Potts in more detail. The
easiest issue to tackle concerns the relationship between the legal form
of a transaction and its so-called substance. Given that CDSs are
functionally very much like insurance, the question is whether their
legal recharacterization can be avoided by shunning the language of
insurance or by inserting “no intention to insure” clauses. The brief
answer is negative, but the matter merits a closer look, as it reveals some
fundamental points about insurance law and CDSs.
1. Insurance Law: The Primacy of Substance over Form
Insurance regulation is not voluntary, and it cannot be avoided
simply because the parties wish to do so. It is, therefore, universally
established that in insurance law, substance matters more than form.145
This raises the question of what substance means.
In English law, the notion of substance refers fundamentally to the
obligation(s) of the insurance provider. 146 In CDS transactions, the
obligation of the protection seller is to compensate for the loss of
conceptually impossible for the event to occur without the protection buyer suffering a
loss; (iii) there are also contracts of insurance that do not provide indemnity against
actual loss; and (iv) “no intention to insure” clauses may not be definitive if there is
evidence of a different true intention. Id.
142. See LAW COMMISSIONS, INSURABLE INTEREST, supra note 92, ¶¶ 7.10–7.17.
They also noted the industry pressure against recharacterizing credit derivatives as
insurance. Id. ¶ 7.11.
143. See infra Part II.H.1.
144. See infra Part II.H.3.
145. On U.S. law, see Hellner, supra note 83, at 500 (“Directly or indirectly this
[formal] test is rejected almost universally. It is not the term used, but the characteristic
features of the activity that are held decisive.”). On English law, see FSA, PERG,
supra note 90, ¶ 6.5.4(1) (“[M]ore weight attaches to the substance of the contract, than
to the form of the contract.”).
146. See FSA, PERG, supra note 90, ¶ 6.5.4(2) (citing In re Sentinel Securities
(1996) 1 WLR 316).
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reference asset value following a credit event because the protection
seller assumes the credit risk in return for periodic consideration.147
Substance does not mean merely the “economic effect” of the
contract. For example, a farmer may enter into a commodity futures
transaction for hedging purposes, but the agreement does not thereby
become an insurance contract.148 Contrary to Potts and his instructing
solicitors, 149 the substance of the transaction does not refer to the
intentions, motivations, or investment strategies of the parties. The FSA
specifically states that it “is unlikely to treat the provider’s or the
customer’s intention or purpose in entering into a contract as relevant to
its classification.”150
The case law in the U.S. and England reveals that insurance law has
been applied to many transactions in which the parties might have been
unaware that they effected insurance, because the rights and obligations
were essentially those of insurance. 151 Of special interest for present
purposes is the English case of Fuji Finance v. Aetna Life Insurance,152
which concerned the legal nature of a financial transaction that consisted
of a single premium capital investment bond that was used as a form of
life insurance.153 At first instance, the court ruled that the contract was
not insurance because there was no sufficiently close connection
between the benefit and the adverse event.154 However, the Court of

147.
148.
149.

See supra notes 16–18 and accompanying text.
See Henderson, Credit Derivatives Are Not “Insurance,” supra note 3, at 4.
See Potts Instructions, supra note 132, at 8 (referring to prior discussions in
which, according to Potts, the construction of a contract depends on “the rights,
obligations and intentions of the parties” at the time of contracting); POTTS OPINION,
supra note 49, ¶ 4 (arguing that construction must depend on “the object of both
parties” because “otherwise some non-disclosed desire” by one party might turn the
transaction into an insurance contract).
150. FSA, PERG, supra note 90, ¶ 6.5.4(2).
151. In the U.S., consider, for example, the numerous burial contract cases. See
Hellner, supra note 83, at 509–10. In England, an amusing example is Dep’t of Trade
& Indus. v. St. Christopher Motorists’ Ass’n Ltd. (1974) 1 All E.R. 395, where a
motorist association’s promise to provide chauffeur services to its members if they lost
their driving license as a result of being convicted of having too much alcohol in the
blood was considered insurance.
152. Fuji Fin. Inc. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1996), 4 All ER 608.
153. See LAW COMMISSIONS, INSURABLE INTEREST, supra note 92, ¶ 7.25 n.21
(summarizing the case and its history).
154. See Fuji Fin. Inc. v. Aetna Life Insurance Co. Ltd (1994) 4 All ER 1025.
According to LAW COMMISSIONS, INSURABLE INTEREST, supra note 92, ¶ 7.25 n.21,
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Appeals reversed the ruling and held that the transaction constituted
insurance, following a broad definition of life insurance.155
Care should be exercised when drawing analogies from Fuji
because the case involved peculiar facts and life insurance. It is clear,
however, that the Fuji decision, at first instance, cannot be relied upon
(as was done by Potts’ instructing solicitors) to argue that a contract
cannot be insurance when it has an investment element.156
2. Transformers: The Sham Paradox
In order to more clearly perceive that the rights and obligations in
CDS transactions are essentially those of an insurance contract, it is
useful to consider so-called transformer arrangements. In these
agreements, CDSs are sometimes explicitly transformed into insurance
contracts in order to exploit differences between regulatory regimes in
banking and insurance (i.e., regulatory capital, tax, and accounting
differences).157 In a typical arrangement, a transformer company would
first write the original CDS, and an authorized insurer would then insure
the transformer company by way of traditional insurance or financial
guaranty insurance.158
This arrangement is especially revealing when the insurance leg
incorporates the CDS terms “back to back.” 159 Some lawyers have
discouraged the incorporation of ISDA’s CDS documentation into the
insurance contract because this creates the risk that a court will hold that
the insurance policy written through the transformer was a sham. 160
However, writing independent terms and different provisions creates

“there was uncertainty about when the money would become payable and it did not
chiefly depend on the length of the insured life.”
155. See Fuji Fin. Inc. (1996) 4 All ER at 618 (finding that the essence of life
insurance is that “the right to benefits is related to life or death”).
156. See Potts Instructions, supra note 132, at 8 (arguing this). The interpretation of
the Fuji cases is more nuanced in POTTS OPINION, supra note 49, ¶ 4.
157. See FSA, RISK TRANSFERS, supra note 141, ¶¶ 3.25–3.29, 3.67, 3.107, 3.116;
id. Annex A; id. Annex B, at 3–4 (discussing the structure, logic and implications of
transformers); Ross & Davies, supra note 133, at 4–5 (describing transformers).
158. See FSA, RISK TRANSFERS, supra note 141, Annex B, at 3.
159. Id.
160. See Ross & Davies, supra note 133, at 4–5; FSA, RISK TRANSFERS, supra note
141, Annex B, at 4, and ¶ 3.108.
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unwanted risks, and the FSA, in 2002, estimated that the standard
approach had been to incorporate ISDA documentation.161
The existence of transformers—and the incorporation of CDS
terms—highlights the difficulty of claiming that CDSs differ from
insurance in terms of the rights and obligations. Such a claim would
imply that two contracts that have exactly the same terms are governed
by entirely different legal rules and regulatory regimes, even though
insurance law is supposed to be determined by substance rather than
form.
There is also another paradox. Some lawyers have argued that the
insurance leg of the transformer arrangement might be construed as a
sham, e.g., an illicit derivatives transaction (into which an insurance
company would be prohibited from entering) masked as an insurance
contract. Yet, it could be argued that the CDS leg is a sham, e.g., an
illicit insurance contract masked as a derivative. These two prospects
cannot both be true at the same time, and this Article submits that the
latter view is better.
3. Where Is the Swap in a Credit Default Swap?
Some have argued that the deliberate avoidance of insurance
language could be interpreted in favor of insurance classification if there
is evidence of deliberate evasion of insurance regulation. 162 The
relevance of that viewpoint becomes manifest when one asks the
apparently childish question: where is the swap in a credit default swap?
A “swap is a private agreement between two parties to exchange
cash flows at certain times according to a prearranged formula.”163 In
other words, a “swap is an exchange of cash flows. A cash flow is a
series of future cash payments.”164 However, a CDS is not an exchange
of cash flows and definitely is not an exchange of credit defaults. 165
CDSs bear no functional resemblance to genuine swap agreements
“[b]ecause the transaction is unilateral . . . , [so] it does not take the form
161.
162.
163.
164.

FSA, RISK TRANSFERS, supra note 141, Annex B, at 4, and ¶ 3.77.
See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
Partnoy, Regulatory Arbitrage, supra note 33, at 219 (emphasis added).
Feder, supra note 21, at 701 (emphasis added); see also Schuyler K.
Henderson, Regulation of Swaps and Derivatives: How and Why?, 8 J. INT’L BANKING
L. 349, 349 (1993) [Henderson, Regulation of Swaps and Derivatives] (providing a
longer but similar description of swaps).
165. See Henderson, Regulation of Swaps and Derivatives, supra note 164.
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of a standard OTC swap contract, which is always bilateral.”166 Also,
“[u]nlike other types of derivatives such as interest rate swaps, the risks
assumed by the protection buyer and the protection seller in a CDS
transaction are not symmetrical.”167 It is hard to avoid the conclusion
that the emperor has no clothes: there is no swap in a CDS.
E. INSURABLE INTEREST
Potts correctly stated that legal construction depends on the rights
and obligations specified in the contract.168 However, the parties may
specify that they wish the contract to be valid even if the buyer has no
insurable interest. This section addresses whether this contract thereby
becomes a non-insurance contract.
1. The Requirement of an Insurable Interest
Contrary to the Potts opinion and the claims of ISDA and others,
insurable interest is not a demarcating factor of insurance law but rather,
a requirement of validity in insurance. “Every contract of insurance
requires an insurable interest to support it; otherwise, it is invalid.”169 In
other words, “insurable interest . . . is a requirement for a valid contract
of insurance and not itself a defining feature of the contract.”170
The standard explanation for the doctrine of insurable interest is
that it reduces the risk of contracts that tempt the insured to bring about
the loss insured against.171 This rationale is debatable,172 but this much
is clear: the requirement of insurable interest is imposed by law, not by
the contracting parties. When the protection buyer has no insurable

166.
167.
168.
169.

BANKS, GLANTZ & SIEGEL, supra note 16, at 33.
Ayadi & Behr, supra note 30, at 182.
See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
E.R.H. IVAMY, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE LAW 23 (1993); see also
CLARKE, supra note 82, at 26.
170. FSA, INSURANCE, supra note 109, ¶ 2.10.
171. See Hazen, supra note 87, at 420–22 (describing the origin of the insurable
interest doctrine).
172. See CLARKE, supra note 81, at 36–37 (critically discussing the traditional
insurable interest doctrine).
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interest, the contract becomes an invalid insurance contract, not a noninsurance contract.173
2. The Relationship Between Adverseness and Insurable Interest
Perhaps, the misunderstanding of Potts and others is due to the
belief that an insurable interest merely means that “an insurance contract
must be a contract against the risk of loss.” 174 However, this
formulation would merge insurable interest with the notion of
adverseness. There is some obiter dicta support for this view,175 but it
seems to have been an unintended inaccuracy.176 The standard view is
that adverseness is a wider notion than the legal requirement of
insurable interest.177
It would be incorrect to argue that CDSs are not insurance when the
default of the reference obligations is not adverse to the protection
buyers, because that treatment confuses adverseness with insurable
interest. Although the notion of an uncertain and adverse event tends to
be underdefined,178 it essentially refers to the nature of the event, which
must constitute a risk of loss for there to be insurance, whereas
“insurable interest” refers to legal restrictions on who is permitted to
purchase insurance on that event.179
In property insurance, the existence of a transferable risk can
normally be determined objectively, and credit default is “a risk of loss
only,”180 much like fire, accident, or other property damage. It is not
insignificant that standard CDS terminology refers to “protection buyer”
and “protection seller.”181 To be sure, persons who stand to benefit from
173. Kimball-Stanley, supra note 3, at 248–49; see also FSA, RISK TRANSFERS,
supra note 141, Annex B, at 1 (noting this, and pointing out that some CDS buyers lack
an insurable interest).
174. POTTS OPINION, supra note 49, ¶ 4.
175. In the English case Medical Def. Union Ltd. v Dep’t (1979) 2 All ER 421, at
423–24, Megarry VC used the notion of “insurable interest” as a defining element of
insurance law.
176. See id. Megarry was referring to Prudential, where the third element is
adverseness, not insurable interest. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
177. See LAW COMMISSIONS, INSURABLE INTEREST, supra note 92, ¶¶ 7.20–7.23
(summarizing literature to this effect).
178. See id. (citing different expressions).
179. See id. at 7.23.
180. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
181. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
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the occurrence of the adverse event would view those events positively
(i.e., someone would benefit from a fire at a competitor’s premises), but
that does not affect the point: a fire insurance policy taken by an arsonist
is not a permitted non-insurance contract (for want of subjective
adverseness), but as an invalid insurance contract (for want of insurable
interest). Therefore, because conflating adverseness and insurable
interest would effectively abolish the requirement of insurable interest,
such treatment cannot be the meaning of the law.
3. Practical Consequences
Applying insurance law to CDSs would imply that some contracts
would be invalid. The general rule in property insurance is that the
protection buyer must have an “economic interest”182 (e.g., a “‘factual
expectation’ of loss”) in the property. 183 Importantly, this corresponds
to an economic notion of hedging that is much broader than a
requirement of holding the underlying debt. English courts have
traditionally been restrictive, requiring “‘a legal or equitable relation’ to
the property,” 184 but recently, more liberal approaches have been
adopted.185
Although the matter is debatable, the requirement of an insurable
interest would address the widely raised concerns related to CDS
speculation. 186 Creating targeted rules for CDSs could reduce the
consequential legal uncertainty.187

182.
183.

See, e.g., N.Y. INS. LAW § 3401 (McKinney 2014).
CLARKE, supra note 81, at 31 (citing Lucena v Craufurd (1806), 2 Bos & Pul
(NR) 269 (HL)). The rule is similar in most common law countries, and in countries
such as France and Germany, the only requirement is proof of loss at the time of claim.
See id. at 32.
184. CLARKE, supra note 81, at 31 (citing Macaura v Northern Assurance Co.
[1925] AC 619).
185. See LAW COMMISSIONS, INSURABLE INTEREST, supra note 92, ¶¶ 5.16–5.19
(discussing Lord Justice Waller’s analysis in Feasey v Sun Life Assurance Co. [2003]
EWCA Civ 885).
186. See supra notes 2, 42–43 and acompanying text.
187. See Juurikkala, EU Short Selling Regulation, supra note 11, ¶ 2 (discussing this
approach in the European Short Selling Regulation).
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F. LOSS INDEMNITY
A related but distinct source of confusion is the notion of loss
indemnity. This section addresses whether CDSs are indemnity or nonindemnity contracts, and whether that distinction matters for their legal
classification. The below analysis leads to the conclusion that CDSs are
normally indemnity insurance contracts, although they may sometimes
be non-indemnity insurance contracts.
1. Are CDSs Indemnity or Non-Indemnity Insurance?
The difference between indemnity and non-indemnity (also called
contingency) insurance refers to the way that compensation is
calculated. In indemnity insurance, payment is made according to
“actual measurable loss” whereas non-indemnity insurance involves “a
pre-determined sum.”188 Non-indemnity contracts are common in life
and personal accident insurance because it is difficult to translate those
harms into monetary terms, so predetermined compensation reduces
costs and uncertainty.189
Which type is a CDS? Given that it promises payment regardless
of proof of loss suffered by a CDS buyer, it might seem like a nonindemnity contract.190 However, this is inaccurate: the legal distinction
is not based on the requirement of proof of loss but rather, on whether
compensation is determined ex ante or ex post. CDS payments are
calculated after the event and according to the loss of value of the
reference obligations, not according to a pre-determined lump-sum
amount.191 CDSs do not refer to personal loss by the protection buyer,
but that is irrelevant. What matters is that compensation depends on the
loss of value of the reference assets, and this is the case in both physical
and cash settlement procedures.192 Therefore, CDSs function like any

188.
189.
190.

CLARKE, supra note 81, at 27.
Id.
See LAW COMMISSIONS, INSURABLE INTEREST, supra note 92, ¶ 7.9 (“In essence
they [credit derivatives] “fulfil many of the common law definitions of non-indemnity
insurance.”). Unfortunately the reasons for that view are not elaborated.
191. On the level of principle, there is agreement that “non-indemnity contracts . . .
pay a lump sum regardless of the amount . . . that is lost.” Id. ¶ 7.14.
192. Physical settlement implicitly provides full compensation, whereas cash
settlement as based on an approximation of the loss of value. See supra note 23 and
accompanying text.
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indemnity transaction and differ essentially from non-indemnity
insurance.193
According to a different interpretation, covered CDSs, which “are
designed to indemnify the protection buyer against loss suffered due to
default . . . for example a bank entering a CDS to protect against
borrower default . . . are in essence a form of indemnity insurance.”194
In contrast, uncovered CDSs would be contingency transactions. 195
However, this analysis confuses two different questions. The first
distinction, between covered and uncovered transactions, refers to the
risk position of the protection buyer, which depends on extra-contractual
factors and is relevant for determining whether the purchaser has an
insurable interest. The second distinction, between indemnity and
contingency insurance, refers to the calculation of the payment amount
and depends on the contract terms. Even covered CDSs are nonindemnity transactions if the payment amount is predetermined rather
than calculated after the fact. Similarly, uncovered CDSs are indemnity
transactions if the payment amount is calculated by reference to a loss of
value.
2. Non-Indemnity Insurance in Property
The distinction has some practical implications, but they are not
fundamental. 196 There is confusion here too, as some commentators
have supposed that if CDSs are non-indemnity transactions, they could
not be re-characterized as insurance.197
However, that is incorrect because non-indemnity insurance is a
recognized category of non-life insurance too.198 In addition to personal
accident insurance, there are non-indemnity contracts in property
193. See Medical Def. Union Ltd. v Dep’t (1979) 2 All ER 42, 422 (noting that in
indemnity insurance, “the measure of the loss is the measure of the payment”, whereas
in contingency insurance, “[t]he sum to be paid is not measured by the loss but is stated
in the policy”).
194. Saunders, supra note 6, at 435.
195. See id.
196. For example, the timing of the insurable interest requirement is different. See
CLARKE, supra note 81, at 27.
197. Id. (“As there is not generally recognised category of contingency insurance,
and these types of CDS are not contracts of life insurance, they escape regulation as
insurance products.”).
198. See LAW COMMISSIONS, INSURABLE INTEREST, supra note 92, ¶¶ 1.17, 3.64–
3.68, 7.42 (discussing non-life, non-indemnity insurance).
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insurance, such as “insurance policies on land, buildings, ships, goods
and merchandise,” paying “a fixed sum on the destruction of these
items.” 199 These policies “do not require the policyholder to have
suffered a loss.”200
G. WEAK POLICY ARGUMENTS AGAINST RE-CHARACTERIZING CDSS AS
INSURANCE
Perhaps, the only reasonable argument against re-characterizing
CDSs as insurance is that insurance law should not apply for practical
reasons. For example, one claim is that CDSs should be subject to
insurance law because the “fundamental objectives of many CDS
transactions set them apart from garden-variety insurance contracts.”201
However, the fundamental objective of covered CDSs is precisely an
insurance objective.202 The rest (uncovered CDSs) are speculative bets
on borrower default that raise important policy concerns like those that
gave rise to the insurable interest requirement.203
According to another argument, the regulations that accompany
insurance products are not needed because “virtually 100% of both the
protection buyers and sellers are institutional investors, with the public
having no exposure, or virtually none, to these contracts.”204 However,
the second part of this claim is manifestly untrue. Firstly, the public has
an interest in the stability of the financial system, which recent
experience shows can be fundamentally devastated by sizable CDS
contracts sold without sufficient loss reserves.205 Secondly, uncovered
CDSs enable investors to take directional bets that otherwise would be
prohibited and that demonstrably have an adverse effect on the
borrowing costs for many companies.206
199.
200.
201.
202.

Id. ¶ 7.42.
Id. ¶ 7.14.
Schwartz, supra note 4, at 182.
This view is acknowledged even by Henderson, Credit Derivatives Are Not
“Insurance”, supra note 3, at 4.
203. See id.
204. Nirenberg & Hoffman, supra note 79, at 15; see also Schwartz, supra note 4, at
182 (supporting this argument); Henderson, Credit Derivatives Are Not “Insurance,”
supra note 3, at 45–46 (arguing that, with CDSs, there is no need for consumer
protection).
205. See supra notes 37–41 and accompanying text; Saunders, supra note 6, at 445–
447 (presenting reasons why CDSs create systemic risks).
206. See supra note 43.
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A third argument is that CDSs have become so commonly treated
as unregulated derivatives that re-characterizing them would destabilize
financial markets. 207 However, legislative reform that includes a
transition period could re-characterize CDSs without disrupting the
markets.208
A more complicated argument that calls for further investigation is
that insurance law would impose unnecessary costs without solving
problems. 209 For the time being, it is important to avoid such
exaggerations, such as the assertion that “[c]redit derivatives help
complete these [loan] markets by allowing the bank to offload the risk to
investors who can more efficiently bear it.”210 In reality, the risks are
often sold to investors who are simply more lightly regulated, such as
unregulated hedge funds. 211 Moreover, the creation of a targeted
regulatory regime for CDSs would improve the suitability of insurance
regulation. 212 Therefore, these arguments against re-characterizing
CDSs as insurance are flawed, unsubstantiated, or speculate downsides
that could be prevented.
H. THE EVOLVING POSITION OF U.S. INSURANCE REGULATORS
The thinking of U.S. insurance regulators concerning CDSs has
evolved substantially, so a chronological analysis is best to understand
this change. The evolution reveals the complex interplay of legal,
financial, and political forces at state and federal levels.213

207. See supra note 135 and accompanying text (emphasizing commercial
expectations).
208. See id.
209. See Henderson, Credit Derivatives Are Not “Insurance,” supra note 3, at 46–
55 (arguing to this effect).
210. Id. at 29.
211. See supra note 41; Wynkoop, supra note 55, at 3105–07 (explaining how
hedge funds are involved in credit derivatives and create systemic risks).
212. For example, see Saunders, supra note 6, at 441–42 (proposing CDS issuers be
subject to prudential regulation, without subjecting CDSs to the regulation of insurance
contracts generally).
213. Insurance regulation in the U.S. is principally determined at state level, based
on the McCarran Ferguson Act of 1945, which has been criticized. See Jonathan R.
Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1945: Reconceiving the
Federal Role in Insurance Regulation, 68 N.Y. U. L. REV. 13 (1993), available at
http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_papers/1605/.
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1. The New York Opinion of 2000
U.S. insurance regulators first touched upon the question of credit
derivatives in 2000 to respond to an inquiry from the banking industry
when the General Counsel of the New York State Insurance Department
(“NYSID”) opined that credit default options are not insurance contracts
if the contractual payment does not require that the protection buyer
suffered a loss.214 Although the opinion was non-binding and did not
necessarily extend to all CDSs,215 it was relied upon,216 and New York
insurance regulators did not interfere with the CDS market until 2008.217
2. The 2003 White Paper on Weather Derivatives
The first signs that not all insurance regulators agreed with the
opinion of the NYSID General Counsel appeared in 2003, when the U.S.
National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) drafted a
White Paper inquiry into weather derivatives. 218 The draft, entitled
Weather Financial Instruments (Temperature): Insurance or Capital
Markets Products?, took the view that weather derivatives
appear to be disguised as “non-insurance” products to avoid being
classified and regulated as insurance products. In fact, there is
evidence that the promoters of these products go to great lengths to
be sure that the energy companies involved do not use terms that
naturally describe what is taking place—namely the transfer of risk
219
from a business to another professional risk taker.

214. See Kimball-Stanley, supra note 3, at 247 (quoting Re: Credit Default Option
Facility, NY Dep’t of Ins. Gen. Counsel June 16, 2000) (“Indemnification of loss is an
essential indicia of an insurance contract which courts have relied upon in the analysis
of whether a particular agreement is an insurance contract under New York law.
Absent such a contractual provision the instrument is not an insurance contract.”).
215. Robert S. Bloink, Does the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act Rein In Credit
Default Swaps? An EU Comparative Analysis, 89 NEB. L. REV. 587, 618 (2011).
216. See id.
217. See id.
218. See Ali & de Vries Robbé, supra note 139, at 180–81; Kimball-Stanley, supra
note 3, at 250.
219. See Kimball-Stanley, supra note 3, at 250 (citing PROPERTY & CASUALTY INS.
COMM., WEATHER FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS (TEMPERATURE): INSURANCE OR CAPITAL
MARKET PRODUCTS? (Sept. 2, 2003)).
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The draft White Paper thus argued that weather derivatives are
insurance contracts and should be regulated as such. Although it
covered only weather derivatives, the position and reasoning of NAIC
was “equally applicable to credit derivatives.” 220 The derivatives
industry was extremely worried about the White Paper and commenced
an intense lobbying effort headed by ISDA.221 The ISDA argued that
the “Draft White Paper’s logic could extend to a broad array of
derivatives and would create substantial and disruptive regulatory
uncertainty.”222 Soon after, NAIC not only shelved the regulatory plans
but also withdrew the White Paper from publication.223
3. Reconsideration After the Financial Crisis of 2008
The financial crisis of 2008 generated new interest in the matter. In
September 2008, NYSID Superintendent Eric Dinallo wrote a Circular
Letter that essentially reversed the position of the NYSID: “the making
of the CDS itself may constitute ‘the doing of an insurance business’
within the meaning of Insurance Law § 1101, [in which case,] the
protection seller should be licensed as an insurer.”224
Dinallo’s reasoning was not entirely clear at this stage. Trying to
maintain the 2000 non-binding opinion, he argued that the opinion “did
not grapple with whether . . . a CDS is an insurance contract when it is
purchased by a party who, at the time at which the agreement is entered
into, holds, or reasonably expects to hold, a ‘material interest’ in the
referenced obligation.”225 In a testimony before a Senate Committee,
Dinallo pointed out that the 2000 opinion had been given in response to
“a very carefully crafted question” that did not cover the CDS market as

220.
221.

Ali & de Vries Robbé, supra note 139, at 180.
See Letter from Joshua D. Cohn, U.S. Legal Counsel, ISDA, to Ernst N.
Csiszar,
President,
NAIC
(Jan.
6,
2004),
available
at
http://www.isda.org/speeches/pdf/NAICletter010604.pdf (explaining that “ISDA is
extremely concerned” about the draft white paper); Letter from Robert G. Pickel, supra
note 129 (arguing that weather derivatives are not insurance).
222. Letter from Robert G. Pickel, supra note 129, at 2.
223. ISDA,
Member
Update
(Mar.
24,
2004),
available
at
http://www.isda.org/c_and_a/pdf/NAICUpdate-032404.pdf (publicizing the success of
the lobbying effort); Ali & de Vries Robbé, supra note 139, at 180–181; KimballStanley, supra note 3, at 250.
224. Dinallo, supra note 70, at 7.
225. Id. at 7.
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a whole.226 So, he argued that covered CDSs were insurance contracts
whereas “naked” (uncovered) CDSs were not. 227 As previously
explained, this distinction arises out of confusion regarding the insurable
interest doctrine.228
On the same day that the Circular Letter was published, New York
Governor David A. Paterson announced that New York State would
begin to regulate CDSs as insurance as of January 1, 2009. 229 This
caused a barrage of criticism from the financial lobby and its legal
representatives.230 The question, however, was not whether insurance
supervisors understood derivatives but whether CDSs were insurance—
something that the supervisors presumably did understand.231 It turned
out that state insurance legislators were increasingly determined to
answer the question in the affirmative.232
4. Plans to Regulate CDSs as Insurance
The banking industry wasted no time fighting the new plan to
regulate CDSs as insurance. Criticism and lobbying must have been
intense given that just two months after Superintendent Dinallo’s
opinion, he announced that “New York will delay indefinitely its
226. Eric Dinallo, Testimony to the United States Senate Committee on Agriculture,
Nutrition,
and
Forestry
5
(Oct.
14,
2008),
available
at
http://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/speeches_ins/sp0810141.pdf. The exact question was:
“Does a credit default swap transaction, wherein the seller will make payment to the
buyer upon the happening of a negative credit event and such payment is not dependent
upon the buyer having suffered a loss, constitute a contract of insurance under the
insurance law?” See id.
227. Id. at 3.
228. Insurable interest is not a factor of demarcation, but a requirement of validity.
See supra Parts II.E.1–2.
229. See, e.g., Danny Hakim, New York to Regulate Credit Default Swaps, N.Y.
TIMES,
C10
(Sept.
23,
2008),
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/23/business/23swap.html.
230. Adam W. Glass, Credit Derivatives as Insurance: In Race to Regulate CDS,
Wrong Runner Takes Early Lead (Oct. 2, 2008), at 5, available at
www.linklaters.com/pdfs/publications/us/
021030_Prudence_Payback.pdf (“Let’s hope [that] this ill-considered proposal can be
promptly squelched, allowing the Insurance Department to go back to regulating
something it understands—insurance.”).
231. See id.
232. See Morelle, supra note 60, at 3 (describing the movement to regulate CDSs as
insurance).
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application of New York Insurance Law to CDS” in anticipation of
federal regulation.233 That seems to have been the last intervention of
the NYSID in the matter.
However, the insurance movement continued. In 2009, the
National Conference of Insurance Legislators (“NCOIL”) prepared
legislation that would regulate covered CDSs—defined as those whose
buyers have a material interest in the reference entity—as credit default
insurance, and the providers would be subject to state insurance
regulations for credit default insurance corporations. In contrast, naked
CDSs would be entirely banned.234 The NCOIL Model Act for credit
default insurance was essentially based on New York laws regulating
financial guaranty insurance.235 In April 2010, a New York State bill
sought to regulate covered CDSs as financial guaranty products under
New York Insurance Law and to ban naked CDSs.236
However, in a foreseeable response, the banking lobby sought
federal preemption. 237 It became increasingly clear that the Obama
administration was determined to federally regulate CDSs as derivatives
and preempt their regulation as insurance.238 Some Senators tried to get
an insurable interest requirement into the Dodd-Frank Act, but that was

233. Eric R. Dinallo, State of New York Ins. Dep’t, First Supplement to Circular
Letter No. 19, Re: “Best Practices” for Financial Guaranty Insurers (Nov. 20, 2008),
available at http://www.dfs.ny.gov/insurance/circltr/2008/cl08_19s1.htm; see also
Bloink, supra note 215, at 619 (noting that the plan was dropped under pressure from
the banking industry).
234. See Davis Polk & Wardwell, The National Conference of Insurance
Legislators’ Model CDS Bill (June 3, 2009), at 3, available at
http://www.davispolk.com/files/Publication/ea407c52-63cb-45b7-9bf07d9ce12400f1/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/2ccba63d-5ad8-4078-97fe83aea7f2b70b/06.03.09.NCOIL
.pdf (providing an overview of the draft model legislation); NCOIL, NCOIL Moves to
Regulate Credit Default Swaps, Press Release (April 8, 2009), available at
http://www.ncoil.org/HomePage/
2009/0492009CDSCallPressRelease.pdf. The final version of the Model Act is
available at http://www.ncoil.org/docs/cdsmodelact.pdf.
235. Davis Polk & Wardwell, supra note 234, at 2.
236. N.Y. Assembly A10783, 233rd Sess. (N.Y. 2010); Sidley Austin LLP, Bill
Introduced in New York Legislature to Regulate ‘Credit Default Insurance’ Based on
NCOIL
Model
(May
3,
2010),
available
at
http://www.sidley.com/insurance_and_financial_services_update_050310.
237. Davis Polk & Wardwell, supra note 234, at 6.
238. Id. at 6.
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rejected.239 As a result, CDSs became regulated as derivatives instead of
insurance.
III. CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS AS DERIVATIVES
The analysis in Part III raises many follow-up questions. How is it
possible that the application of insurance law to some or all CDSs was
so widely ignored and so easily avoided? How could CDSs be globally
established as unregulated “swaps” when they are economically not
swaps at all? Why did the Dodd-Frank Act preempt insurance
regulation seemingly without debate? 240 One might suggest that it
simply took time for insurance regulators to grasp what these
transactions really consisted of, but such an answer is far from complete.
This Part argues that the issue can only be understood in light of a
longer historical evolution marked by two opposing forces: antispeculation and pro-regulation initiatives on one side and anti-regulatory
and regulation-evasive initiatives on the other. Part III.A briefly
outlines the historical background of more recent developments. Then,
Part III.B describes the leading role played by International Swaps and
Derivatives Association in the creation of an unregulated space for OTC
swaps. Finally, Part III.C analyzes the Dodd-Frank Act reforms and
finds that, although they seek to rein in the excesses of modern finance,
they paradoxically end up consolidating ISDA’s largely unregulated
swaps regime.
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: LAW VS. FINANCE
1. Traditional Anti-speculation Law
The relationship between law and finance has been tense
throughout history: legislators have placed various restrictions on
financial activity, ranging from limits on interest-taking to a marked

239. See Ronald D. Orol, Senators Reject Effort to End Debate on Bank Bill,
MARKETWATCH (May 19, 2010), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/rejection-ofdemocrat-measures-may-slow-bank-bill-2010-05-19 (discussing the Senate’s rejection
of Senator Dorgan’s amendment, which would have imposed an insurable interest
requirement on CDSs).
240. See infra note 378 and accompanying text.
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hostility towards speculative activities.241 In particular, the law of many
countries traditionally viewed gambling as a socially undesirable
activity, either prohibiting or heavily regulating it.242 The law’s disdain
of gambling was not limited to cards and casino, as also “investing,
hedging, and insurance have been compared with gambling and, to
varying degrees, social distaste for gambling has been used as a
rationale for regulation of these other activities.”243 Thus, for example,
common law courts frequently refused to enforce commodity forward
contracts—often called difference contracts—if they were perceived as
speculative wagers instead of hedging transactions.244
2. The Rise of Private Orderings
Insofar as the only problem was the refusal to enforce the contracts,
market participants found a way to avoid the restrictions by way of
private orderings, i.e. by creating extra-legal arrangements for enforcing
contracts without resorting to courts. 245 The leading example is the
commodity exchanges created since the mid-19th century, developing
mechanisms for not only trading physical commodities, but also
speculating in changes in price in ways that could be enforced without
courts. 246 Over time, the exchanges created a self-regulatory system

241. Lynn A. Stout, Why the Law Hates Speculators: Regulation and Private
Ordering in the Market for OTC Derivatives, 48 DUKE L.J. 701, 703 (1999) [hereinafter
Stout, Speculators]
242. See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, Derivatives and the Legal Origin of the 2008 Credit
Crisis, 1 HARVARD BUS. L. REV. 1, 12–13 (2011) [hereinafter Stout, Legal Origin],
available
at
http://www.hblr.org/download/HBLR_1_1/StoutDerivatives_and_the_Credit_Crisis.pdf (discussing the traditional common law
approach); Hazen, supra note 87, at 377 (“[G]ambling is not generally viewed as a
productive activity or one that provides any benefit to society beyond its entertainment
value [which] is generally seen as outweighed by the social costs of gambling.”).
243. Hazen, supra note 87, at 377.
244. See Stout, Legal Origin, supra note 242, at 11–12 (discussing cases); Stout,
Speculators, supra note 241, at 712–34 (discussing a range of U.S. “antispeculation”
laws, both in common law and statute).
245. See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal
Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992).
246. See Stout, Legal Origin, supra note 242, at 14–15 (describing this
development). For a detailed study, see Jonathan Ira Levy, Contemplating Delivery:
Futures Trading and the Problem of Commodity Exchange in the United States, 18751905, 3 AM. HIST. REV. 307 (2006).
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consisting of “membership standards, collateral (‘margin’) posting
requirements, capital requirements, and standardized contract terms”.247
One interesting aspect of the legal evolution is that the success of
respectable exchanges also attracted secondary business—so called
“bucket shops”—which copied the betting opportunities without
imposing membership requirements.248 These contracts were in many
ways analogous to what now are called “over-the-counter”
derivatives. 249 However, many U.S. states criminalized these OTC
activities with the so-called “anti-bucketshop” laws; the exchanges
started their parallel attacks against price quotation stealing, and were
backed by the courts.250 In summary, speculative derivative contracts
were permitted, but only within self-regulatory spaces.
3. The 1930s Regulatory Regime and Its Erosion
The self-regulatory regime for speculative contracts was shattered
following the Great Crash of 1929, which reawakened the traditional
anti-speculative attitudes. 251 This led to a new wave of federal
legislation that still forms the backbone of U.S. financial regulation.252
In relation to financial derivatives, the 1930s legislation had two
principal effects. Firstly, in line with earlier common law and state antibucketshop statutes, the legislation—particularly the Commodity
Exchange Act of 1936 253 —reinforced the prohibition of OTC
speculative activities by requiring that all transactions take place in
regulated exchanged (called “contract markets”). 254 Secondly, it
subjected the exchanges to public supervision under a hybrid regulatory
system that combines elements of self-regulatory and command-andcontrol regulation, headed by the Securities and Exchange Commission
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.

Stout, Legal Origin, supra note 242, at 16.
Id. at 16–17.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 16–17.
See David Hirshleifer, Psychological Bias as a Driver of Financial Regulation,
14 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 856, 861 (2008) (noting how the Crash caused an attack on
speculators).
252. See, e.g., Partnoy, Derivatives Regulation, supra note 53, at 429–33 (discussing
the federal regime and its general problems with respect to derivatives).
253. Commodity Exchange Act, ch. 545, 49 Stat. 1491 (1936) (as amended).
254. Stout, Legal Origin, supra note 242, at 18 (“Federal law, like state
antibucketshop statutes, went beyond the common law by making off-exchange futures
illegal as well as judicially unenforceable.”).
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(“SEC,” for securities options) and the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (“CFTC,” for commodity futures and options).255
Over time, however, this regime of contract-market monopoly was
eroded by three principal factors. Firstly, market participants began to
design novel contracts in order to fit them into exemptions to the
regulated markets (a form of regulatory arbitrage). 256 Secondly, turf
battles between the two regulators tended to widen the regulatory gaps,
as there emerged difficulties in fitting new instruments into the
traditional categories of “securities” and “futures.” 257 Thirdly,
especially from the 1980s onwards, the rule-book was increasingly
liberalized: on one hand, many financial contracts were excluded from
the ambit of gaming laws, and gambling itself was gradually
legalized; 258 on the other hand, OTC derivatives were expressly
deregulated by way of a process that is next described in detail.259
B. THE PATH TO UNREGULATED SWAPS: THE INTERNATIONAL SWAPS AND
DERIVATIVES ASSOCIATION
Deregulated OTC derivatives have roots in the 19th century, but
their spectacular growth and global consolidation is a more recent
phenomenon, which cannot be understood without reference to the

255. See, e.g., PHILIP MCBRIDE JOHNSON & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, DERIVATIVES
REGULATION: VOLUME 1 § 2.02 (2004) (describing the system of contract market
monopoly).
256. Hazen, supra note 87, at 390; see also JOHNSON & HAZEN, supra note 255, §
1.02[8] (describing the deterioration of the exchange monopoly).
257. Hazen, supra note 87, at 390; Partnoy, Derivatives Regulation, supra note 53,
at 431–33 (describing turf battles).
258. See Hazen, supra note 87, at 396–97 (noting the liberalization of gambling
laws). In the U.S., many states continue to have restrictive gambling laws, whereas in
the U.K., gambling was drastically liberalized by the Gambling Act 2005 (UK).
However, it had been emphasized earlier that bona fide commercial or financial
transactions will not be held to be wagering contracts. See Morgan Grenfell v Welwyn
Hatfield District Council [1995] 1 AER 1.
259. On the process in the U.S., see Stout, Legal Origin, supra note 242, at 18–22;
on the U.K., see Colin Scott & John Biggins, Public-Private Relations in a
Transnational Private Regulatory Regime: ISDA, The State and OTC Derivatives
Market Reform, 13 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 309, 318–19 (2012) (explaining that the
enforceability of purely speculative OTC derivatives was guaranteed first by section 60
the Financial Services Act 1986 (UK), and then by section 8 the Financial Services and
Markets Act 2000 (UK)).
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International Swaps and Derivatives Association. 260 The role of one
organization should not be exaggerated, but there is no reason to be
dismissive about ISDA which, according Frank Partnoy, has been “the
most powerful and effective lobbying force in the recent history of
financial markets.”261 According to Scott and Biggins, “[t]he influence
of ISDA is undoubtedly a key factor in the public deregulation of OTC
derivatives trading by legislators in the latter 20th century, especially in
the US.” 262 Flanagan agrees that “ISDA has played a key role in
keeping the OTC derivatives industry self-regulated.”263
1. ISDA’s Origins and Activities
ISDA was born in the 1980s, when Wall Street investment banks
began to develop novel over-the-counter derivatives transactions such as
swaps. 264 A leading motivation for OTC derivatives was regulatory
arbitrage, as it was thought that “swaps were unregulated and immune
from most securities-law disclosure requirements.”265 They were also
apparently subject to “off balance sheet” accounting treatment, which
made their risks less transparent and enabled banks to offer products that
are functionally equivalent to positions that client institutions were not

260. ISDA has only lately has attracted scholarly interest. See, e.g., Braithwaite,
supra note 13 (discussing ISDA’s Master Agreement regime); Gelpern & Gulati, supra
note 17 (discussing ISDA’s dispute resolution system); Scott & Biggins, supra note 259
(discussing ISDA’s relations with nation states); Huault & Rainelli-Le Montagner,
supra note 128 (describing ISDA’s influence strategies); Glenn Morgan, Legitimacy in
Financial Markets: Credit Default Swaps in the Current Crisis, 8 SOCIO-ECON. REV.
17, 32–40 (2010) (discussing ISDA’s activities following the 2008 crisis); HEATHER
MCKEEN-EDWARDS & TONY PORTER, TRANSNATIONAL FINANCIAL ASSOCIATIONS AND
THE GOVERNANCE OF GLOBAL FINANCE: ASSEMBLING POWER AND WEALTH 43–46
(2013) (describing ISDA’s role in global finance). One of the early studies on ISDA’s
activities is Sean M. Flanagan, The Rise of the Trade Association: Group Interactions
Within the International Swaps and Derivatives Association, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV.
211 (2001) (providing a pro-ISDA perspective to its history and activities).
261. FRANK PARTNOY, INFECTIOUS GREED: HOW DECEIT AND RISK CORRUPTED THE
FINANCIAL MARKETS 47 (2004) [hereinafter PARTNOY, INFECTIOUS GREED].
262. Scott & Biggins, supra note 259, at 323.
263. Flanagan, supra note 260, at 246.
264. See PARTNOY, INFECTIOUS GREED, supra note 261, at 38–45 (describing early
swaps and other derivatives transactions).
265. Id. at 48.
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permitted to take. 266 Besides, as non-exchange transactions, many
swaps were customized and therefore highly profitable to the dealers.267
It seems that at first the investment banks largely ignored the fact
that the new OTC derivatives may have been void under the common
law and illegal under the Commodity Exchange Act.268 But the first
source of worries was the Financial Accounting Standards Board (the
U.S. accounting self-regulatory body), which in February 1985 started
asking difficult questions about the new products.269 This led, within
weeks after the inquiry, to the formation of the International Swap
Dealers’ Association. 270 The name was changed into International
Swaps and Derivatives Association in 1993,271 seemingly “in an attempt
to show ISDA was more than just a lobbying vehicle for the top swap
dealers.”272
ISDA’s principal objectives were “to establish standardized
documentation and practices, to lobby against new regulations, and to
determine how big the swaps market really was.”273 In the words of one
of the leading members, the goal was to “organize before any problems
arise”,274 although ISDA’s first press release merely stated that it sought
to “advance general market practices and to discuss issues of relevance
to the financial community.” 275 It has been claimed that “everyone
involved understood that the primary role would be to lobby against
266. Id. at 45–46 (describing banks’ activities and arguments); Partnoy, Derivatives
Regulation, supra note 53, at 426–28 (describing regulatory arbitrage uses of early
derivatives). Avoiding regulations was a motivating factor even before the 1980s. See
Flanagan, supra note 260, at 223 (“Some simple swap-like agreements were developed
in the late seventies to bypass certain United Kingdom currency restrictions”).
267. PARTNOY, INFECTIOUS GREED, supra note 261, at 49; Partnoy, Derivatives
Regulation, supra note 53, at 427–28 (noting that customized swaps are more profitable
than “plain vanilla” swaps); Flanagan, supra note 260, at 234 (“Banks [in the 1980s]
received large fees and substantial spreads for arranging interest-rate and currency
swaps”).
268. Stout, Legal Origin, supra note 242, at 19; Stout, Speculators, supra note 241,
at 780.
269. PARTNOY, INFECTIOUS GREED, supra note 261, at 46.
270. Id.
271. Flanagan, supra note 260, at 222.
272. PARTNOY, INFECTIOUS GREED, supra note 261, at 152.
273. Id at 47.
274. John P. Forde, Big Firms Involved in Rate Swaps Form Dealers Association,
THE BOND BUYER, at 4 (Mar. 8, 1985) (citing Jonathan Berg, a vice president at
Bankers Trust).
275. Id.
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regulation of swaps”,276 although it seems that a parallel motivation was
to coordinate the ownership and development of the standard
documentation, which the leading swap dealers had developed
informally since 1984.277
2. A Friend of Courts and Lawyers
The first ISDA Master Agreement related to swaps was published
in 1987, and generic OTC derivatives Master Agreements have been
published in 1992 and 2002. 278 The importance of the ISDA Master
Agreement project extends far beyond copyright protection, because
what began as ordinary contract standardization became, over time,
something of “an industry-wide constitution.” 279 Today, ISDA’s
“standard form documentation enjoys a near-monopoly in the vast
‘over-the-counter’ derivatives markets.”280
ISDA’s contractual self-governance project includes an active
relationship with the courts through its amicus curiae briefs in OTC
derivatives litigation.281 These interventions are fundamental, because
they seek to persuade courts of “ISDA’s preferences” regarding the
interpretation of the standardized documents.282 Given ISDA’s expertise
and its role as the originator of the contracting scheme, it is likely to
yield significant interpretative power in courts.283
Apart from courts, ISDA works closely with leading law firms,
having over the years developed a network of cooperating lawyers
around the world.284 The leading example of ISDA’s influence among
276.
277.

PARTNOY, INFECTIOUS GREED, supra note 261, at 47.
See Flanagan, supra note 260, at 234–38 (describing the standardization

project).
278. Braithwaite, supra note 13, at 787. On the development of the ISDA Master
Agreements, see Flanagan, supra note 260, at 243–45.
279. Gelpern & Gulati, supra note 17, at 357.
280. Braithwaite, supra note 13, at 779.
281. See ISDA, Amicus Briefs, http://www.isda.org/speeches/amicusbriefs.html (last
visited June 2, 2014).
282. Scott & Biggins, supra note 259, at 326.
283. See supra note 47. To be sure, courts have not always accepted ISDA’s
proposals. See Braithwaite, supra note 13, at 799–800 (discussing English cases).
However, in these cases the principal reason was that “the contractual language left
room for disagreement.” Id. at 800.
284. See, e.g., Flanagan, supra note 260, at 233 (“ISDA has hired law firms around
the world to research the potential enforceability of close-out netting in their
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lawyers is the Potts opinion, which “was unanimously acknowledged as
one of the great successes of the organization.” 285 Together with its
allies, ISDA skillfully created the appearance of a legal consensus,
receiving the support of prestigious law firms, which appeared in the
debate without disclosing their close ties to ISDA.286
The ISDA-generated legal consensus has been supported by the
logic of courts in London and New York, which in resolving
international finance disputes are highly sensible to the practical
consequences of their decisions, applying “laws or ideas from several
different jurisdictions in order to reach a commercially sensible result”
and attempting to “make decisions that will facilitate international
finance.”287 This decision-making is shaped by what Goode has called
judicial parallelism,288 whereby courts are reluctant to break an apparent
consensus among leading jurisdictions in matters of international
finance. 289 Therefore, creating the appearance of consensus has the
power to shape the law itself, because courts are unlikely to challenge it.
Unsurprisingly, the ISDA Master Agreement of 1992 and 2002
propose exclusive jurisdiction to either English or New York courts.290
These choice-of-law provisions can be sidestepped, but parties are
warned that “extreme care should be exercised in doing so since the
ISDA master agreement has not been prepared with a view to
enforceability under other legal systems.”291 This warning is important,
because choice of law and jurisdiction is important for managing legal

jurisdictions”); id. at 235 (describing long-standing cooperation with Cravath, Swaine
& Moore); id. at 240 (showing how several key ISDA figures came from Cravath).
Later, Adam W. Glass of Linklaters has been an active collaborator. See supra notes 51,
230.
285. Huault & Rainelli-Le Montagner, supra note 128, at 559–60.
286. See supra notes 132–135 and accompanying text. Flanagan reveals that “Allen
& Overy functions as ISDA’s primary European counsel.” Flanagan, supra note 260, at
233. Schwartz also turns out to be an Allen & Overy Associate. Schwartz, supra note
4, at 167.
287. Agasha Mugasha, International Financial Law: Is the Law Really
“International” and Is It “Law” Anyway?, 26 BANKING & FIN. L. REV. 381, 392 (2011)
[hereinafter Mugasha, International Financial Law].
288. ROY GOODE, COMMERCIAL LAW IN THE NEXT MILLENNIUM 92 (1998).
289. Mugasha, International Financial Law, supra note 287, at 443 (citing
Lordsvale Finance Plc v. Bank of Zambia, 3 All E.R. 156 [1996]).
290. Braithwaite, supra note 13, at 789.
291. SCHUYLER K. HENDERSON, HENDERSON ON DERIVATIVES 838 (2010).

2014]

DECODING THE MYSTERY OF
CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS

473

risk related to “conflicting views as to the true nature, the contractual
obligations, or the consequences of the financial transaction.”292
3. Lobbying Victories in the 1990s: Widening the Regulatory
Exemptions
Cooperation with courts and lawyers was essential to financial
deregulation, as “the ISDA Master Agreement project was highly
successful in assuring public actors that the OTC derivatives industry
was in fact capable of largely self-regulating.” 293 However, this
obviously was not enough. If the dealers and investment banks were at
first dismissive of legal risks, this did not last long, and by the end of the
1980s, they were actively trying to change the rules.294 Throughout the
1990s a key input for legal reform in financial markets came from the
banking industry,295 and ISDA played a lead role.296
The rhetorical keyword was “legal certainty”.297 What this meant
was certainty that the regulators would not apply the restrictive rules—
especially the exchange-trading requirement of the Commodity
Exchange Act (“CEA”)—to the new OTC transactions, which clearly
had been made in violation of the rules.298 While there is no doubt about
ISDA’s professional competence, it has over the years acquired a
reputation for its aggressive lobbying methods. 299 These have been
described as “both condescending (saying officials couldn’t possible
understand derivatives) and reassuring (saying Wall Street had
everything under control).” 300 According to one testimony from the
1990s, “ISDA came to Washington telling everyone they’re stupid.
Their message was that everything is okay [in derivatives]—a blanket
292. Mugasha, International Financial Law, supra note 287, at 393; see also id. at
408–09.
293. Scott & Biggins, supra note 259, at 323.
294. Stout, Legal Origin, supra note 242, at 19; Stout, Speculators, supra note 241,
at 780.
295. Stout, Legal Origin, supra note 242, at 18–20 (describing banking industry
initiatives in the 1990s).
296. See Flanagan, supra note 260, at 245–46 (highlighting ISDA’s growing
involvement in politics in the 1990s).
297. See Stout, Legal Origin, supra note 242, at 19.
298. Id.
299. See PARTNOY, INFECTIOUS GREED, supra note 261, at 142 (describing Mark C.
Brickell, vice president at J.P. Morgan and ISDA’s “top lobbyist” in the 1990s).
300. Id.
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statement, boom.”301 This rhetoric has been backed up by threats that
campaign donations would suffer, as financial firms spend large
amounts of money in political contributions and lobbying, and “ISDA’s
members were major political contributors.” 302
A modest victory was gained in 1989, when the CFTC issued a safe
harbor policy statement, “declaring that [it] would not attempt to
regulate swap transactions.” 303 However, this had at least two
limitations. One was that the CFTC policy statement listed five criteria
for applying the safe harbor, in summary: “(1) individually tailored
terms; (2) absence of exchange-style offset; (3) absence of clearing
organization or margin system; (4) the transaction is undertaken in
conjunction with a line of business; and (5) prohibition against
marketing to the public.”304 According to Partnoy, “[f]or many swaps at
least one of the criteria—often several—were not satisfied.”305
The second limitation of the 1989 safe harbor was that it did not
change the fundamental rules, because the CFTC had no authority to rewrite the rule-book. However, following intense lobbying, Congress in
1992 passed the Futures Trading Practices Act, 306 granting the CFTC
authority to exempt derivatives from the application of the CEA, and
determining that “federal law now preempted any state laws that made
OTC derivatives unenforceable, whether as gambling contracts or
otherwise.” 307 This was promptly followed by the CFTC in 1993
formally exempting OTC swaps from the ambit of the CEA, as well as
from state gambling and antibucketshop laws. 308 However, the 1993
301. GILLIAN TETT, FOOL’S GOLD: HOW THE BOLD DREAM OF A SMALL TRIBE AT J.P.
MORGAN WAS CORRUPTED BY WALL STREET GREED AND UNLEASHED A CATASTROPHE
38 (2009) (citing Christopher Whalen).
302. Id.
303. Stout, Legal Origin, supra note 242, at 19; see also CFTC, Policy Statement
Concerning Swap Transactions, 54 Fed. Reg. 30,694 (July 21, 1989); Partnoy,
Derivatives Regulation, supra note 53, at 435–36 (describing the Policy Statement).
304. Partnoy, Derivatives Regulation, supra note 53, at 436; see CFTC, supra note
303, at 30,696–97.
305. Partnoy, Derivatives Regulation, supra note 53, at 438. For a detailed analysis,
see id. at 439–42.
306. Pub. L. No. 102-546, 106 Stat. 3590.
307. Stout, Legal Origin, supra note 242, at 19; see also Futures Trading Practices
Act, §§ 502(a) (amending 7 U.S.C. § 6), 502(c) (amending 7 U.S.C. § 16(e)(2)(A)).
308. Regulation of Hybrid Instruments, 58 Fed. Reg. 5,581 (Jan. 22, 1993) (codified
at 17 C.F.R. pt. 35); see also Stout, Legal Origin, supra note 242, at 19–20; PARTNOY,
INFECTIOUS GREED, supra note 261, at 147; Partnoy, Derivatives Regulation, supra note
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exemption “did not provide nearly the certainty it could have.”309 In
particular, the exempted “swap agreements” did not expressly include
credit default swaps,310 and given that CDSs are financially not swaps at
all, there is no reason to presuppose that they would have been covered
by the exemption.
4. Managing the Image: Derivatives Scandals
Ironically, the granting of some “legal certainty” to OTC swaps
was almost immediately followed by a series of major losses and
scandals involving OTC derivatives.311 While these events are open to a
range of interpretations, 312 they certainly caused a political backlash,
which had already been brewing for some time. 313 A year earlier,
Representative Jim Leach had begun “asking some uncomfortable
questions of Mark Brickell and the ISDA lobby.” 314 This led to the
publication, by House Banking Committee staff, of a 900-page report on
derivatives in November 1993, condemning the unregulated market.315
When the crisis hit the market in 1994, new debates were fuelled, as the
Government Accounting Office (“GAO”) produced a report highly
critical of the lack of derivatives regulation,316 and Leach introduced a
derivatives bill based on his staff report.317

53, at 436–37 (describing it and pointing out it “was described as [Wendy] Gramm’s
‘farewell gift’ to the swaps industry.”).
309. Partnoy, Derivatives Regulation, supra note 53, at 437.
310. See id. (describing the exemption).
311. See Stout, Legal Origin, supra note 242, at 20 (“Just as a nineteenth century
judge might have predicted, the near-immediate result was a series of swapsfueled
speculative disasters.”); PARTNOY, INFECTIOUS GREED, supra note 261, at 112–38
(describing the events leading to the derivatives scandals of 1994); FCIC Report, supra
note 1, at 46–47 (discussing swaps scandals after 1993).
312. See Flanagan, supra note 260, at 226–27 (presenting a pro-dealer view of some
of the cases).
313. See PARTNOY, INFECTIOUS GREED, supra note 261, at 147 (describing growing
skepticism already in 1992, including a Congress request to the Government
Accounting Office to consider the necessity of regulating derivatives).
314. Id. Partnoy speculates that one possible reason for Leach’s activism was he
“did not receive financial support from Wall Street and members of the ISDA.” Id. at
147–48.
315. Id. at 148.
316. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-94-133, FINANCIAL
DERIVATIVES: ACTIONS NEEDED TO PROTECT THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM (1994), available
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ISDA’s response was highly effective. 318 Among other things,
ISDA skillfully influenced the media, persuading journalists to use the
word “securities” instead of “derivatives” when reporting derivatives
scandals.319 Brickell also attacked Leach in the media for resorting to
“serious misstatements of fact”, 320 claiming for example that Leach’s
bill would impose a suitability standard “not applied to any other area of
finance”, when in fact it was similar to the already-existing suitability
standards in other areas.321 He also “complained about the Leach bill’s
supposed capital standards for swaps, when in fact the bill contained no
such provisions.”322
ISDA was not fighting alone, as it was backed up by high-profile
figures including Gerald Corrigan (former head of New York Fed, then
at Goldman Sachs) and Wendy Gramm (former CFTC chair, then board
member at Enron). 323 In the end, the public lost interest in these
complicated issues, and all the legislative initiatives died down; the
result was a surprise even to industry members, according to the
Institutional Investor magazine, which “gave the credit to ISDA”.324
at http://archive.gao.gov/t2pbat3/151647.pdf; PARTNOY, INFECTIOUS GREED, supra note
261, at 150 (describing the report).
317. See PARTNOY, INFECTIOUS GREED, supra note 261, at 152. There were also
three other bills. See, e.g., TETT, supra note 301, at 38.
318. According to TETT, “behind the scenes, Brickell and other ISDA officials
furiously leapt into lobbying action, determined to block the bills before Congress.
Brickell paid a frenetic series of visits to Republican and Democratic congressmen. He
also relentlessly called journalists, trying to persuade them to stop writing about
derivatives in such a negative light. He then met regulators around the world,
preaching the gospel that the industry was capable of cleaning up its act on its own.”
TETT, supra note 301, at 38.
319. PARTNOY, INFECTIOUS GREED, supra note 261, at 151 (providing examples and
citations from personal correspondence between ISDA and Byron E. Calame, thendeputy managing editor of the Wall Street Journal).
320. Id. at 152
321. Id.
322. Id. According to Partnoy, on July 12, 1994, at hearing on the bill, Leach “lost
his patience with Brickell . . ., accusing him of lying about provisions of the derivatives
bill.” Id. (citing Lynn Stevens Hume, Regulators, Industry Give Differing Views on
Bill; Leach Blasts Bank Official for Misstating Provisions, THE BOND BUYER, at 6
(1994)).
323. Id. at 153–54.
324. Id. at 154 (citing Michael Peltz, Congress’s Lame Assault on Derivatives,
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, at 65 (1994)); see also TETT, supra note 301, at 39–40
(describing ISDA’s victory).
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Another publicity challenge came in 1998, when the massive hedge
fund Long Term Capital Management nearly collapsed, threatening the
stability of the entire banking sector and leading to an almost-$4 billion
bailout.325 Only weeks before, the CFTC—now headed by derivativescritical Brooksley Born—had suggested it would reconsider OTC
derivatives regulation. 326 However, having learned from the previous
crisis, the derivatives industry was well prepared and “besieged
Congress with appeals to stop any federal regulatory effort.”327 Now the
industry was strongly represented in key government organizations,
which reacted the very same day of CFTC’s pronouncements to prevent
any changes to the rule-book.328 In fact, new laws were enacted, this
time only limiting the powers of CFTC to determine OTC derivatives
rules.329
5. The Silent Revolution: Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000
If the 1990s derivatives debacles did not lead to re-regulation, they
made the banking lobby increasingly aware of the precarious status of
OTC derivatives. Therefore, in 1999, a Presidential Working Group of
high-profile figures in the administration with close ties to the
investment banking lobby was formed in order to “modernize”
derivatives regulation. 330 The Working Group complained about the

325. See FCIC Report, supra note 1, at 57 (discussing the LTCM case); Stout, Legal
Origin, supra note 242, at 20.
326. See CFTC, Over-the-Counter Derivatives Concept Release (May 7, 1998),
available at http://www.cftc.gov/opa/press98/opamntn.htm; Scott & Biggins, supra
note 259, at 319; Stout, Legal Origin, supra note 242, at 20 (noting that “[t]his was a
dramatic shift in policy, as it implied OTC derivatives might be treated as illegal offexchange futures.”)
327. Stout, Legal Origin, supra note 242, at 20.
328. See U.S. Treasury, Joint Statement by Treasury Secretary Robert E. Rubin,
Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan and Securities and Exchange
Commission Chairman Arthur Levitt (May 7, 1998), available at
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/rr2426.aspx;
Scott
&
Biggins, supra note 259, at 319 (describing the backlash).
329. Stout, Legal Origin, supra note 242, at 21; see also Stout, Speculators, supra
note 241, at 768.
330. Stout, Legal Origin, supra note 242, at 21; see PRESIDENT’S WORKING GRP. ON
FIN. MRKS., OVER-THE-COUNTER DERIVATIVES MARKETS AND THE COMMODITY
EXCHANGE ACT (Nov. 1999) [hereinafter PWG REPORT], available at
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/otcact.pdf.
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“cloud of legal uncertainty [that] has hung over the OTC derivatives
markets in the United States in recent years . . . [and] could discourage
innovation and growth of these important markets.”331 Instead of reexamining the need to regulate OTC derivatives, the objective was to
guarantee the enforceability of off-exchange derivatives.332
This was duly accomplished the following year with the passage of
the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, which drastically
expanded the scope of deregulated derivatives markets.333 As a piece of
legislation, it is “long, complex, technical, and difficult to understand,”
which may explain why its “passage went relatively unnoticed and
unremarked by anyone outside the derivatives industry.” 334 Yet its
significance can hardly be overstated: according to Hazen, “[t]he
increased regulation of the securities markets in the wake of the late
1990’s corporate governance scandals […] stands in sharp contrast to
the massive deregulation of the commodities and non-securities
derivatives markets that was ushered in by the Commodity Futures
Modernization Act”.335 Moreover, it has been claimed that ISDA was
heavily involved in the drafting process.336
The CFMA had at least two important consequences. One, it
“restricted the capacity of the SEC and CFTC to directly intervene in
OTC trading between sophisticated market participants.”337 In terms of
the CFTC and the CEA, the CFMA exempted OTC derivatives made
between eligible contract participants and subject to individual
negotiation. 338 With respect to the SEC, the CFMA ensured that the
notion of “securities” would not include any “security-based swap
agreement.” 339 It also reduced the powers of the SEC to investigate

331.
332.
333.

PWG REPORT, supra note 330, at 1.
Stout, Legal Origin, supra note 242, at 21.
For a detailed overview of the CFMA, see, for example, JOHNSON & HAZEN,
supra note 255, § 1.18; Hazen, supra note 87, at 388–95.
334. Stout, Legal Origin, supra note 242, at 21.
335. Hazen, supra note 87, at 382.
336. PARTNOY, INFECTIOUS GREED, supra note 261, at 295.
337. Scott & Biggins, supra note 259, at 320.
338. Stout, Legal Origin, supra note 242, at 21 (citing CFMA §§ 103, 120 (codified
at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2(h), 25(a)(4) (2012)); Sjostrom, supra note 41, at 986; Wynkoop, supra
note 55, at 3100.
339. See CFMA § 302(a), § 303(a) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77b-1, § 78c-1 (2012));
Sjostrom, supra note 41, at 984. A “security-based swap agreement” is a swap “of
which a material term is based on the price, yield, value, or volatility of any security . . .
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fraud, manipulation or insider trading in security-based swap
agreements.340
Secondly, the CFMA expanded the notion of swap agreements,
explicitly mentioning credit default swaps.341 The CFMA definition of
swap agreements is complex, but what makes it interesting is that it
departs radically from standard financial definitions of swaps: instead of
referring to an exchange of cash-flows, it extends swaps to an agreement
that “transfers . . . the financial risk associated with a future change in
any . . . value or level [of securities or other financial or economic
interests] known as . . . credit default swap.”342 The text is paradoxical,
because it defines CDSs in terms of a pure risk transfer, but simply calls
them swaps. This suggests that the drafters were aware of the awkward
status of CDSs as swaps, but they were determined to exploit the fact
that OTC swaps had become the least regulated legal category, and few
people outside the industry understood them anyway.
Another paradox of the CFMA is that its official objectives
included “reduc[ing] systemic risk by enhancing legal certainty.”343 The
apparent justification for this claim was that the uncertain enforceability
of OTC derivatives might cause disruptions. 344 This reasoning was
optimistic in retrospect, as the passage of CFMA was followed by a
spectacular growth of OTC derivatives trading—especially of a
speculative nature—as anyone could have predicted.345 Stout has gone
so far as to argue that “the [2008] credit crisis was not primarily due to
‘innovations’ in the markets or the legal system’s failure to ‘keep pace’
with finance. The crisis was caused, first and foremost, by changes in
the law.”346
C. THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS: THE PARADOXICAL DODD-FRANK
.,” so that it is not regulated as a security. See Sjostrom, supra note 41, at 985; 15
U.S.C. § 78c note (2012).
340. Sjostrom, supra note 41, at 985.
341. See id. at 984–85 (discussing the definition of “swap agreement” in CFMA).
342. 15 U.S.C. § 78c note (2012).
343. CFMA § 2(6); see also PWG REPORT, supra note 330, at 6 (noting the same
objective).
344. Stout, Legal Origin, supra note 242, at 22.
345. See Stout, Legal Origin, supra note 242, at 22–29 (describing the
developments); Stout, Speculators, supra note 241, at 772–73 (arguing, in 1999, that
enabling speculation would increase systemic risks).
346. Stout, Legal Origin, supra note 242, at 3.
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ACT
The lack of regulation was challenged at least temporarily by the
global financial crisis, and in addition to the steps taken by state
insurance regulators, bills were introduced at federal level to prohibit
uncovered CDSs or all CDS trading.347 But the industry, led by ISDA,
fought back.348 At first it denied any problems, but soon a cooperative
mode was adopted that would prove to be highly effective.349 Although
the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 takes a step in the direction of more
regulation, a closer look reveals a mixed picture with respect to OTC
derivatives.350
1. New Restrictions
For CDSs, the Dodd-Frank Act increases regulation at least in four
ways. Firstly, it abolishes the CFMA prohibition of regulating OTC
derivatives by affirming the jurisdiction of CFTC over “swaps” and SEC
over “security-based swaps”. 351 Secondly, it subjects “security-based
347. Respectively, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. § 355(h) (2009) and H.R. 3145, 111th
Cong. § 4 (2009); see Shadab, supra note 4, 425 (describing federal bills). Even the
Derivatives Markets Transparency and Accountability Act of 2009 (H.R. 977) initially
proposed a ban on uncovered CDSs, but this was subsequently reduced to regulatory
authority to prohibit “abusive swaps” and finally abandoned altogether. See Saunders,
supra note 6, at 448 n.151; Ben Moshinsky & Aaron Kirchfeld, Naked Swaps
Crackdown in Europe Rings Hollow Without Washington, BLOOMBERG (March 11,
2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/
news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aj9Qo2YqmFKs.
348. Christopher Arup, The Global Financial Crisis: Learning From Regulatory
and Governance Studies, 32 L. & POL. 363, 371 (2010).
349. See HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMM. ON AGRIC., SER. NO. 111–1, HEARING
TO REVIEW DERIVATIVES LEGISLATION 165 (Feb. 3, 2009), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111hhrg51698/pdf/CHRG-111hhrg51698.pdf
(showing Senator James C. Marshall, GA, getting impatient with ISDA’s Robert Pickel
for “just stonewalling” and suggesting “that the industry start considering compromises
instead of just blowing through all of this”).
350. See Kristin N. Johnson, Things Fall Apart: Regulating the Credit Default Swap
Commons, 82 U. COLO. L. REV. 167, 234–42 (2011) (critically discussing the DoddFrank Act’s approach to CDSs); Stout, Legal Origin, supra note 242, at 31–36
(likewise, with respect to OTC derivatives generally).
351. Dodd-Frank Act, §§ 722(a)–(b), 762(a); see Bloink, supra note 215, at 607–08;
Eduard H. Cadmus, Note, An Altered Derivatives Marketplace: Clearing Swaps Under
Dodd-Frank, 17 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 189, 208–09 (2012).
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swap dealers” and “major security-based swap participants” to SEC
registration. 352 Thirdly, it prohibits federal bailouts of “swaps
entities”. 353 Fourth, it imposes a clearing requirement for speculative
swaps.354
There are, however, several reasons why the outcome is far from
onerous. For one thing, SEC and CFTC jurisdiction is limited to what is
expressly admitted.355 Similarly, the bailout prohibition—known as the
“swap pushout rule”356—is watered down in various ways: it does not
apply to insured depository institutions, 357 and does not prevent them
from establishing affiliates that function as swaps entities.358 Thus it has
been estimated that the “exceptions to the general prohibition threaten to
swallow the rule, and the exposure of many financial institutions to CDS
risk will continue.”359
2. Mandatory Clearing and Its Limits
The principal solution offered by Dodd-Frank for the problems of
OTC derivatives is the imposition of a mandatory central counterparty
clearing requirement for many of these transactions.360 The principle is
the same as in the old Commodity Exchange Act, which required “that
speculative commodity futures be traded only on organized
exchanges.” 361 The objective is to promote transparency and reduce
counterparty risks.362
352. Dodd-Frank Act, §§ 731, 764; see also Cadmus, supra note 351, at 213;
Bloink, supra note 215, at 609–10. On the definition of swap dealers and major swap
participants, see Cadmus, supra note 351, at 210.
353. Dodd-Frank Act, § 716; see Bloink, supra note 215, at 610–12.
354. Dodd-Frank Act, §§ 723(a)(2), 763(a); see Bloink, supra note 215, at 608–09;
Cadmus, supra note 351, at 213–14.
355. Dodd-Frank Act, § 712(b).
356. Annette L. Nazareth, Dodd-Frank Act Finalizes Swap Pushout Rule, HARV. L.
SCH. FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (July 7, 2010),
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2010/07/07/dodd-frank-act-finalizes-swappushout-rule.
357. Dodd-Frank Act, § 716(b)(2)(B).
358. Dodd-Frank Act, § 716(c).
359. Bloink, supra note 215, at 611.
360. Dodd-Frank Act, § 723(a)(2) (swaps); § 763(a) (security-based swaps).
361. Stout, Legal Origin, supra note 242, at 34.
362. Johnson, supra note 350, at 234–38. On the details, see also Cadmus, supra
note 351, at 219; Stout, Legal Origin, supra note 242, at 34.
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The question is how much will be achieved. The first concern
relates to the exceptions to the clearing requirement. One of them
applies when swaps are used by a non-financial entity “to hedge or
mitigate commercial risk.”363 Other transactions may also be exempted
from clearing, because this is ultimately subject to SEC and CFTC
determinations. 364 Some commentators have been worried that the
regulators might yield to the enormous pressure of the financial
industry. 365 This concern is especially pertinent in relation to
customized CDSs, which cannot be cleared so easily.
In fact, several commentators claim that there is an automatic
exemption for non-standardized CDSs and other derivatives that
clearinghouses will not accept for clearing.366 The legal basis of this
affirmation is not entirely clear.367 But if non-standardized transactions
are exempted, there is an enormous regulatory loophole.368 To be sure,
even non-cleared swaps must be reported to a registered swap data

363. Dodd-Frank Act, §§ 723(a), 763(a); see also Stout, Legal Origin, supra note
242, at 34; Cadmus, supra note 351, at 213; Johnson, supra note 350, at 239 n.369
(providing details).
364. Dodd-Frank Act, §§ 723(a) (CFTC), 763(a) (SEC); Bloink, supra note 215, at
608 (SEC); Cadmus, supra note 351, at 214 (CFTC).
365. Stout, Legal Origin, supra note 242, at 36.
366. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Identifying and Managing Systemic Risk: An
Assessment of Our Progress, 1 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 94, 101 n.29 (2011),
http://www.hblr.org/?p=1412 (“Dodd-Frank includes an exception for derivatives that a
clearinghouse will not accept for clearing. Dodd-Frank Act sec. 723(a), § 2(h)(3).”);
Johnson, supra note 350, at 240 (“The Dodd-Frank Act requires that only standardized
credit default swap contracts be cleared through a central counterparty or derivatives
clearing organization.”); Regulatory Reform and the Derivatives Market: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Agric., Nutrition, and Forestry, 111th Cong. 8, 89 (2009)
(statement of Gary Gensler, Chairman, Commodity Futures Trading Commission) (“It
is important that tailored or customized swaps that are not able to be cleared or traded
on an exchange be sufficiently regulated.”).
367. Dodd-Frank Act § 723(a) amends § 2(h)(3)(C) of the Commodity Exchange
Act so that the Commission must determine whether and under what conditions, if any,
a “swap, or group, category, type, or class of swaps” must be subject to such clearing.
Id. In making this determination, the crucial question for the Commission is whether
the contracts satisfy § 2(h)(2)(D), which provides five factors that the Commission must
consider, including trading liquidity. See id. Therefore, there is a legal basis for
exempting some contracts from the mandatory clearing requirement, but it is not an
automatic exemption and is subject to significant prudential judgment. See id.
368. Frank Partnoy, Danger in Wall Street’s Shadows, N.Y. TIMES (May 14, 2009);
Johnson, supra note 350, at 241.
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repository,369 and SEC and CFTC have powers to investigate “abusive
swaps”, i.e. transactions seen to be “detrimental to . . . the stability of a
financial market . . . or . . . participants in financial markets.”370 If
CDSs continue to be widely used by hedge funds and investment banks,
these powers of investigation should be exercised.
The second concern is that “the clearinghouse requirement might
inadvertently concentrate systemic risk in the clearinghouses
themselves.” 371 According to one expert, “it is plausible that central
clearing would raise systemic risks greatly when another crisis occurred
and perhaps even raise the likelihood of a crisis.”372 While it is true that
clearinghouses have rarely failed, one should not rely too much on
history. 373 Recent decades have witnessed several clearinghouse
failures, and there is a danger that complex OTC derivatives would
create substantial difficulties, especially if clearinghouses are forced to
accept them. 374 It has also been argued that the current resolution
system is highly vulnerable to systemic risk in derivatives
clearinghouses.375
3. Preemption of Insurance Regulation
For the present Article, one of the key aspects of Dodd-Frank is
that the derivatives industry obtained an exclusion of insurance
regulation. 376 This was a surprise, because the original draft did not
address the question of CDSs and insurance, and in fact sought to
369. Dodd Frank Act, §§ 727, 729, 766; Bloink, supra note 215, at 608; Cadmus,
supra note 351, at 214–15.
370. Dodd Frank Act, § 714; Bloink, supra note 215, at 608–09.
371. Schwarcz, supra note 366, at 101 n.29; see also Julia Lees Allen, Note,
Derivatives Clearinghouses and Systemic Risk: A Bankruptcy and Dodd-Frank
Analysis, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1079, 1091–93 (2012); Christopher L. Culp, OTC-Cleared
Derivatives: Benefits, Costs, and Implications of the “Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform
and Consumer Protection Act,” 2 J. APPLIED FIN. 1, 23 (2010).
372. Chester S. Spatt, Complexity of Regulation, 3 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 1, 6 (2012),
http://www.hblr.org/?p=2299.
373. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,
Remarks at the 2011 Financial Markets Conference: Clearinghouses, Financial
Stability, and Financial Reform 8 (Apr. 4, 2011) available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20110404a.pdf.
374. Spatt, supra note 372, at 6; Culp, supra note 371, at 23.
375. See Allen, supra note 371, at 1093–106.
376. Cadmus, supra note 351, at 208.
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impose an insurable interest rule on uncovered CDSs.377 The banking
lobby was able not only to block this but also to obtain an express
exclusion of insurance law, which was added to the final version of the
law seemingly without careful examination. 378 Thus Section 722
(amending the Commodity Exchange Act) states laconically: “A swap—
(1) shall not be considered to be insurance; and (2) may not be regulated
as an insurance contract under the law of any State.” 379 Similarly,
Section 767 adds (amending the Securities Exchange Act): “A securitybased swap may not be regulated as an insurance contract under any
provision of State law.”380
One might question the applicability of these exclusions to CDSs,
given that it is difficult to see how CDSs could be functionally labeled
swaps.381 Therefore the definition of “swaps” in Section 721 has been
rendered so broad that it is almost another label for any derivative.382 It
also expressly includes a “transaction commonly known as . . . a credit
default swap”.383
As an ironic consequence of this anti-functionalist approach to
classifying financial products, concerns have subsequently been raised
that the new rules are creating legal uncertainty to insurers, because such
contracts as financial guaranty insurance might come under the
regulation of swaps (which insurers are not permitted to trade).384 This

377.
378.

See Saunders, supra note 6, at 448 n.151.
See Letter from Robert Damron, President, and Joseph Morelle, Chairman of
the Fin. Services & Inv. Products Comm.Committee, Nat’l Conference of Ins.
Legislators, to Barney Frank, Chairman of the U.S. House-Senate Financial Reform
Conference
Comm.Committee
(June
15,
2010)
(available
at
http://www.ncoil.org/HomePage/2010/07152010615CDSLetter.pdf.).
379. Dodd-Frank Act, § 722.
380. Dodd-Frank Act, § 767. This statement is strangely found under the heading
“State Gaming and Bucket Shop Laws,”suggesting that it was added late in the drafting
process.
381. See supra Part II.D.3.
382. Stout, Legal Origin, supra note 242, at 33; see Dodd-Frank Act § 721(a)(21);
Cadmus, supra note 351, at 209–10 (explaining the definition). The amended
definitions merely exclude some derivatives as non-swaps.
383. Dodd-Frank Act § 721(a)(21). For our purposes, the definition of “securitybased swap agreements” in the Securities Exchange Act refers back to this revised
definition of swaps: see Dodd-Frank Act § 761(a)(6).
384. See Houman B. Shadab, Doesn’t Anyone Want to Be a Swap Anymore? (Nov.
1, 2011), http://lawbitrage.typepad.com/blog/2011/11/doesnt-anyone-want-to-be-aswap-anymore.html (describing insurance industry concerns).
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absurdity is the logical consequence of artificially creating different
regulatory regimes for transactions that have exactly the same content,385
and legal uncertainty can only be avoided by giving strict primacy to
form over substance, in contradiction with insurance law tradition.386
CONCLUSION
This Article has clarified our legal understanding of CDSs in two
principal ways: firstly, in relation to insurance, showing how the
principles of insurance law are correctly applied to CDSs, and secondly,
in relation to derivatives, explaining how the deregulated space for OTC
derivatives was created, consolidated, and expanded to include CDSs.
In relation to insurance law, this Article has firstly pointed out that,
contrary to an oft-repeated belief, New York Insurance Law did not
define CDSs as non-insurance transactions.387 It has then explained why
the no-intention-to-insure argument is defective both in law and in
fact, 388 also demonstrating that “credit default swaps” are not
structurally and economically swaps at all. 389 It has also cleared up
confusion regarding the notions of insurable interest and loss indemnity,
proposing how they should be applied to CDSs.390
In order to explain the derivatives-characterization of CDSs, the
Article has argued that the financial sector has skillfully exploited the
increasingly disparate treatment of functionally similar transactions.391
On one hand, the restrictive regime of insurance regulation was avoided
in subtle ways such as by promoting a private legal opinion (the Potts
opinion) to this effect,392 obtaining favorable responses from regulators

385.
386.
387.
388.
389.
390.
391.

See supra Part II.D.2.
See supra Part II.D.1.
See supra Part I.C.3.
See supra Part II.D.
See supra Part II.D.3.
See supra Parts II.E and II.F.
CDSs are at the intersection of securities, derivatives, gambling, and insurance:
they have been mostly classified as either derivatives or insurance contracts, but some
have defined them as securities. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. Still others
have called them “gambling” (for example New York State Governor Paterson). See
Hakim, supra note 229. On the increasingly disparate regulation of securities,
derivatives, gambling, and insurance, see Hazen, supra note 87 (analyzing this issue
systematically).
392. See supra Parts II.C.1 and III.B.2.
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to narrowly formulated questions,393 and proposing novel definitions or
demarcation criteria of insurance. 394 On the other hand, the banking
lobby introduced the novel concept of swap, which was first used to
exploit regulatory exemptions, 395 and later extended to an increasing
range of transactions, including CDSs.396
The arguments presented here imply several questions for scholars
and policymakers. In terms of legal doctrine, the present situation is
uncomfortable, as the arguments for the derivatives-based view are
based on a misinterpretation of insurance law principles, 397 and
buttressed by a misreading of legislation. 398 As it moreover remains
unclear on what basis CDSs can be meaningfully described as swaps,399
this raises the question of whether this terminology was but a trick for
avoiding regulation. In consequence, functionally identical transactions
may now be insurance, derivatives, or even both.400 In the U.S., the
confusion is only exacerbated by Dodd-Frank Act’s preemption of
insurance law, which is coupled with an all-encompassing notion of
swaps that extends this deregulated category to CDSs on a purely
formalistic basis.401 There is no synthesis or compromise between the
different views, which merely seem to co-exist side by side, at best
agreeing to disagree.
In terms of financial regulation, the recent reforms are a modest
step forward—but very modest indeed, as they are also filled with
problems: Firstly, the Dodd-Frank compulsory clearing rule is likely to
apply only to some CDSs, leaving others unregulated. 402 Secondly,
393.
394.

See supra Part II.H.1 and notes 225–227 and accompanying text.
See supra note 95 and accompanying text (noting Henderson’s use of a nonlegal definition); Kimball-Stanley, supra note 3, at 262–66 (criticizing the distinctions
proposed by Schwartz, and Nirenberg and Hoffman). One might also speculate that the
erroneous interpretation of New York Insurance Law, supra Part I.C.3, may have been
influenced by the desire to liberate CDSs from insurance law. See supra notes 65–66.
Shadab, Sjostrom and Schwartz are all opposed to the application of insurance
regulation to CDSs.
395. See supra Parts III.B.1 and III.B.3.
396. See supra notes 342 (CFMA) and 383 (Dodd-Frank Act) and accompanying
text.
397. See supra Part II.
398. See supra Part I.C.3.
399. See supra Part II.D.3.
400. See supra Part II.D.2.
401. See supra notes 384–386 and accompanying text.
402. See supra notes 363–368 and accompanying text.
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there are serious worries regarding the concentration of systemic risks in
derivatives clearinghouses, which may sow the seeds of a new crisis.403
Thirdly, many concerns associated with CDSs remain largely
unaddressed. 404 Thus there is an urgent need for continued critical
investigation on the real costs and benefits of CDSs and their regulatory
options.
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See supra notes 371–375 and accompanying text.
See supra Parts I.B.2 and II.G.

